Download the original attachment
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13505 March 30, 1960
BACOLOD MURCIA MILLING COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. FIDEL HENARES, as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the late DON ESTEBAN HENARES, Defendant-Appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.: chanrobles virtual law library
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental ordering plaintiff to turn over to the Provincial Sheriff the sum of P4,407.23 representing the amount of attorney's lien in favor of Ricardo Nolan.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
There is no dispute as to the essential facts. This case began sometime in November, 1946 when Ricardo Nolan appeared as counsel in an action for foreclosure of mortgage instituted by the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc. against Fidel Henares, as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate of the late Esteban Henares. This case was docketed in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental as Civil Case No. 546. After trial, the Court rendered, on July 11, 1947, its decision, the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment sentencing the defendant herein as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Esteban Henares to pay unto the plaintiff the amount of P31,405.52 with legal interest at the rate of 6% annually, from the date of the filing of the complaint until fully paid, plus 10% of the total indebtedness as attorney's fees and costs of this litigation, within ninety (90) days after Executive Order No. 25, as amended by Executive Order No. 32, known as the Debt Moratorium, shall have been lifted by His Excellency, the President of the Republic of the Philippines, and in case of failure by the defendant to effect payment thereof after the expiration of said period of time, the mortgaged properties shall be sold in accordance with law and the proceeds of said sale shall be applied to the payment of said obligation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Years later, on July 7, 1953, Ricardo Nolan filed a notice of lawyer's lien with the Court, alleging that he was entitled to 10% of the amount of the judgment in Civil Case No. 546 as attorney's fees. Plaintiff-appellant opposed this notice of lawyers' lien on the ground that petitioner Nolan had ceased to be their lawyer; and that furthermore, it had no record confirming the allegations of Nolan.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On November 13, 1953, a writ of execution was issued in the foreclosure suit (Civil Case 546) in favor of plaintiff-appellant Bacolod-Murcia, and in pursuance thereof, the mortgaged properties covered by the judgment were sold at public auction on July 16, 1954, a certificate of sale of the same date having been issued by the Provincial Sheriff in favor of the Bacolod-Murcia, as the successful bidder.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On September 4, 1954, the sale at public auction was confirmed by the Court. Four days later, or on September 8, 1954, Ricardo Nolan petitioned that plaintiff-appellant Bacolod-Murcia be ordered to pay him the sum of P4,407.23, the amount of his lawyer's lien. Plaintiff-appellant again filed an opposition, based mainly on its argument that the judgment having been satisfied by the sale of the mortgaged properties (confirmed on September 4, 1954 before the petition of Nolan), there was no longer any judgment to which the attorney's lien asserted by Nolan could legally attach; consequently, it argued, the lower court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition filed by Nolan.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
After presentation of evidence for both parties, the trial court issued an order dated December 24, 1954, the dispositive positive reading:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders the plaintiff to turn over to the Provincial Sheriff of Negros Occidental the sum of P4,407.23, the amount of petitioner's lawyer's lien, from the proceeds of the Sheriff's sale, which are in the possession of the said plaintiff, so that the Sheriff can turn over said amount to the petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
From the above order, plaintiff Bacolod-Murcia appealed to the Court of Appeals; but that Court certified the case to us, because the appeal raises purely questions of law; and, moreover, because the jurisdiction of an inferior court is put in issue.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Reduced to its essence, the appeal of Bacolod-Murcia is based on the contention that the petition of Ricardo Nolan of September 8, 1954, praying for payment of his attorney's lien, is beyond the jurisdiction of the lower court, said petition having been filed only after the satisfaction of the foreclosure judgment, which for all purposes terminated the case; this, notwithstanding that on July 7, 1953, long before the writ of execution was issued in the case, Nolan filed a notice of lawyer's lien with the court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The decisive issue upon which hinges the resolution of this appeal is whether the satisfaction of the judgment in a foreclosure suit, by the purchase by the judgment creditor in a judicial sale of the property mortgaged, extinguishes attorney's lien.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The American precedents (our law on the matter being of American origin) hold that satisfaction of the judgment, in general, does not by itself bar or extinguish the attorney's (6 C.J. 797-798, citing cases). As a matter of fact, a satisfaction of the judgment had been in disregard of the attorney's rights, notice having previously been given to the judgment debtor, the court may, upon the attorney's motion, vacate such satisfaction and enforce judgment for the amount of the lien (In Re King, 60 NE 1054; Goodrich vs. McDonald, 112 NY 157, 19 NE 649; and Pritchard vs. Fulmer, 2 ALR 474 and cases cited therein). In other words, a satisfaction of the judgment in fraud of the lien may be vacated even by motion and the attorney will be allowed to enforce the judgment for the amount of his lien (6 C. J. 797-798, citing Desaman vs. Butler, 114 Minn. 362, 131 NW 463, Northrup vs. Hayward, 113 NW 701, and others).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The American cases holding that satisfaction of the judgment extinguishes the lien proceed on the theory that there has been waiver of the lien either by the attorney's active conduct (as in Bernabee vs. Holmes, 88 NW 1098, and Goodrich vs. McDonald, 19 NE 649) or by passive omission (as in Pritchard vs. Fulmer, 2 A. L. R. 474).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Can it be said that in the case at bar, the attorney waived his lien by failing to take steps to indicate his desire to preserve his lien? We think not. He filed a notice of lawyer's lien on July 7, 1953, which he served on his client and on the adverse party in the case. He wrote a letter to the Provincial Sheriff of Negros Occidental before the sale at public auction of the mortgaged property was held, and in which he said:
You are hereby requested to retain from the proceeds of the sale of the above-referred to property and turn over to the undersigned the amount of the lawyer's lien which is P4,407.63.
This notice accounts for the annotation made by the Sheriff on the Certificate of Title in favor of the plaintiff-appellant in the following tenor:
Esta venta esta sujeta a la reclamacion de Don Ricardo Nolan sobre sus honorarios en la cantidad de P4,404.63.
Without resolving the validity of said annotation, which is merely a confirmation of the information given by Attorney Nolan regarding his lien, the acts of the latter cannot be construed as a waiver. On the contrary, they indicate that he wanted the same to be preserved.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Turning now to the jurisdiction of the Court below to enforce the lien after satisfaction of the judgment, in the Philippines, the attorney's charging lien is embodied in Section 33, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, and attaches -
Upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he (the attorney) has secured in a litigation of his client.
When Ricardo Nolan filed his notice of lawyer's lien on July 7, 1953, such lien properly attached to the judgment for the payment of money and to all executions that might thereafter be issued in pursuance of such judgment, in accordance with Section 33, Rule 127, above-cited. Nolan filed notice of his lien long before the sale of the mortgaged properties on July 16, 1954, and even before the writ of execution was issued on November 13, 1953. The court, therefore, properly acquired jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim for attorney's fees, since an attorney's lien takes legal effect from and after the time the attorney's lien takes legal effect from and after the time the attorney concerned caused notice of said lien to be entered in the record, and served on his client and the adverse party. (Dahlke vs. Vi�a, 51 Phil., 707; Macondray and Co., Inc. vs. Jose, 66 Phil., 590; Menzi and Co. vs. Bastida, 63 Phil., 16). The operative fact that determines the birth of the lien, it is clear, is the time at which the lawyer caused a statement of his claim to be entered in the record, and not any other. That the amount of the attorney's lien was, at the time, unliquidated, does not militate against this conclusion, as it has been held that it is not necessary to the existence of the lien that the amount due the attorney should be liquidated, although the exact amount of the claim should be determined before the lien can be enforced (Dahlke vs. Vi�a, supra).
An attorney may cause a statement of his claim to be registered even before the rendition of any judgment, because the purpose of recording his lien is merely to establish his right thereto, as distinguished from the enforcement of the lien which takes place only after the judgment is secured in favor of the client. (Palanca vs. Pecson, 94 Phil., 419; 50 Off. Gaz., 1585.).
When, on July 16, 1954, the sale at public auction was made and the judgment legally satisfied, Nolan could not have lost his right to enforce the lien which he had upon the judgment, since he had filed notice of the lien as far back as July 7, 1953. It was this notice which conferred on the court the jurisdiction to determine the lien. Nolan's subsequent petition on September 8, 1954 was but an incident in the enforcement of the lien and should not be made the determinative factor on the question of jurisdiction. Nor did the sale of the property at public auction extinguish the lien; for, while in this jurisdiction the lien does not attach to the property in litigation, it is obvious that it should attach to the proceeds of the judgment for the payment of money, otherwise, the lien would be meaningless and of no substance. A judgment for money is only as valuable as the amount that could be realized therefrom; and to speak of a lien on the judgment without including therein its proceeds, at least in pecuniary terms, is to lose perspective in the differentation of substance and form.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Moreover, the nature of a charging lien argues that it should attach to the proceeds of a judgment. Such lien has been regarded as:
an equitable right to have the fees and costs due to him for services in a suit secured to him out of the judgment or recovery in that particular suit. . . . It is based on the natural equity that the plaintiff should not be allowed to the appropriate the whole of judgment in his favor without paying there out for the services of his attorney in obtaining such judgment. (6 C. J. 766-767, citing cases) chanrobles virtual law library
The lien of an attorney upon a judgment of his fees and disbursements in the cause . . . is properly denominated a lien in the broad sense of the term, but it has few points of resemblance to the ordinary lien upon tangible property. It does not depend in any way upon possession, but rests on the equity of the attorney's claim, to be repaid out of the proceeds of a judgment. (Wright vs. Cobleigh, 21 N. H., 339, 341, cited in, 6 C. J. 767) chanrobles virtual law library
The attorney's lien, whether under the statute or at common law, is equitable in its nature. Even the decisions in this country, which confine its existence and application to the narrowest limits, always speak of it as an equitable lien, right or privilege. It is not property in the thing, which gives a right of action at law. It is a charge upon the thing which is protected in equity. Courts of law may recognize it when the res is in possession of the lienor, and the owner is seeking to deprive him of such possession. But where the thing is not in possession, and some affirmative action is required by the attorney, he, like other claimants, must seek relief in equity. In some instances, a formal suit should be instituted; in others, an application to the court rendering the judgment, for the proper order, would be sufficient. (Fillmore vs. Wells, 10 Colo. 228, 236, 15 P. 343, 3 AMSR 567, cited in 6 C. J. 767)
It is well to note that the lien in the present case is not sought to be enforced as against the debtor but against the attorney's client, who received the proceeds of the judgment. There is no reason why it should not be enforced against said client, since the lien should attach to the proceeds of the judgment and he received the same without paying his attorney who was responsible for its recovery. The client, upon receiving satisfaction without paying his lawyer, held the proceeds for the judgment in trust for his lawyer to the extent of the value of his recorded lien, because after the charging lien has attached, the attorney is, to the extent of said lien, to be regarded as and equitable assignee of the judgment or funds produced by his efforts. (Epp. vs. Hinton, 102 Kan. 435; 6 C. J. 766, citing cases.) chanrobles virtual law library
Hence, the attorney can enforce his lien in the case, for anyway, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the matter of the lien when it attached upon the filing of notice of lawyer's lien on July 7, 1953, and until the same is settled, the court should be deemed to have retained jurisdiction. The tendency of the cases is to have the attorney's fees determined and enforced in the same action where the services were rendered, to avoid multiplicity of suits (Palanca vs. Pecson, supra; Fabie vs. Ngo Boo Soo, 84 Phil., 857). In a case similar to the one at bar (M. E. Grey vs. Insular Lumber Co., 97 Phil., 833, judgment was entered for plaintiff for a sum of money. In compliance with the judgment, defendant issued a check in favor of plaintiff and gave this check to the attorney. The lawyer presented a motion with the trial court asking that the defendant be ordered to issue two checks, one, for the plaintiff, and another, for his fees. The court determined the lawyer's fees and ordered the defendant therein to issue two checks as prayed for by the attorney. On appeal, this Court remanded the case to the trial court for the determination of the lawyer's fees and to give an opportunity for the plaintiff therein or his representative to appear and contest the amount claimed, as in the first instance, plaintiff was not represented. The remand to the trial court to determine the lawyer's fees even after the judgment had been satisfied, could only mean that the court did not thereby lose jurisdiction to entertain the petition to enforce the lien.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Indeed, as observed in Goodrich vs. McDonald, supra,
The lien, as thus established, is not strictly like any other lien known to the law, because it may exist, although the attorney has not, and cannot in any proper sense have, possession of the judgment recovered. It is a peculiar lien, to be enforced by peculiar methods. It was a device invented by the courts for the protection of attorneys against the knavery of their clients, by disabling clients from receiving the fruits of recoveries without paying for the valuable services by which the recoveries were obtained. The lien was never enforced like other liens.
Moreover, to hold in the instant case that the lien was extinguished in the premises is to put a premium and an undue emphasis on tendencies which are better curbed than encouraged. It would practically require that an attorney, having secured a judgment for his client for the payment of money, should not only file his notice of lawyer's lien and have the right thereto determined but also apply to the court for execution of the judgment in order to anticipate a possible duplicity on the part of said client, thereby subordinating his clients' interest to his own. This is conduct which, by ethical considerations, should be viewed askance; much less, therefore, should it, by legal compulsion, be given encouragement.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Plaintiff-appellant assigns as another error that the order appealed from does not contain any statement of the facts and the law on which it is based. Obviously, this is based on Section 1, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, and Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution. The contention is untenable, since these provisions have been held to refer only to decisions on the merits and not to orders of the trial court resolving incidental matters such as the one at bar (See Soncuya vs. National & Investment Board, 40 Off. Gaz. 6th Sup. 297).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed. Costs against appellant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-35612-14 June 27, 1973
NORBERTO MENDOZA, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON, NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, GUMACA BRANCH, PRESIDED OVER BY THE HONORABLE JUAN MONTECILLO, and THE PROVINCIAL WARDEN OF QUEZON PROVINCE, Respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
FERNANDO, J.:
Our resolution of January 26, 1973 dismissing these petitions for habeas corpus, certiorari and mandamus for lack of merit is sought to be reconsidered. It was our ruling that petitioner failed to sustain the burden of showing that his confinement was marked by illegality or that the order cancelling the bail previously issued was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. It is to credit of his able counsel, former Senator Estanislao Fernandez, that his fight for provisional liberty is carried on with a further manifestation of skilled scholarly effort, but such valiant attempt to secure his release is doomed to fail. The law, as will hereafter be set forth, points to the contrary. Deference to its command precludes a reconsideration. This resolution will likewise briefly touch upon the question of why the issuance of a brief dismissal order does not in any wise offend against the constitutional provision requiring that no decision "shall be rendered by any court of record without on which it is based." 1 chanrobles virtual law library
1. Habeas corpus could be invoked by petitioner if he were able to show the illegality of his detention. There is aptness and accuracy in the characterization of the writ of habeas corpus as the writ of liberty. Rightfully it is latitudinarian in scope. It is wide-ranging and all embracing in its reach. It can dig deep into the facts to assure that there be no toleration of illegal restraint. Detention must be for a cause recognized by law. The writ imposes on the judiciary the grave responsibility of ascertaining whether a deprivation of physical freedom is warranted. This it has to discharge without loss of time. The party who is keeping a person in custody has to produce him in court as soon as possible. What is more, he must justify the action taken. Only if it can be demonstrated that there has been no violation of one's right to liberty will he be absolved from responsibility. Unless there be such a showing, the confinement must thereby cease.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The above formulation of what is settled law finds no application to the present situation. Petitioner's deprivation of liberty is in accordance with a warrant of arrest properly issued after a determination by the judge in compliance with the constitutional provision requiring the examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses produced. 2No allegation to the contrary may be entertained. It cannot be denied that petitioner's co-accused, Nelso Unal, Hermogenes Lumanglas and Leopoldo Trinidad, had previously come to this court to challenge the filing of one information where there were three victims. Accordingly, this Court, in Unal v. People, 3required three separate amended informations. There was no question, however, as to the legality of the warrants of arrest previously issued, not only in the case of the parties in such petition, but likewise of petitioner. Habeas corpus, under the circumstances, would not therefore lie." 4 chanrobles virtual law library
2. Even if it be granted that petitioner may not be released on a habeas corpus proceeding, is he, however, entitled to bail? Precisely that is the remedy by which, notwithstanding the absence of any flaw in one's confinement, provisional liberty may still be had. Such a remedy, as a matter of fact, was granted him in accordance with an order of the municipal court of Mulanay. Thereafter, however, the bail was revoked by the Court of First Instance in the order now challenged. Such actuation he would now condemn as a grave abuse of discretion. In the landmark decision of Chief Justice Concepcion, People v. Hernandez, 5the right to bail was rightfully stress as an aspect of the protection accorded individual freedom which, in his eloquent language," is too basic, too transcendental and vital in a republican state, like ours, ...." 6To be more matter of fact about it, there is this excerpt from de la Camara v. Enage 7 "Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charged with capital offense when the evidence of guilt is strong. Such a right flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thereby a regime of liberty is honored in the observance and not in the breach. It is not beyond the realm of probability, however, that a person charged with a crime, especially so where his defense is weak, would just simply make himself scarce and thus frustrate the hearing of his cage. A bail is intended as a guarantee that such an intent would be thwarted. It is, in the language of Cooley, a mode short of confinement which would, with reasonable certainty, insure the attendance of the accused for the subsequent trial. Nor is there anything unreasonable in denying this right to one charged with a capital offense when evidence of guilt is strong, as the likelihood is, rather than await the outcome of the proceeding against him with a death sentence, an ever-present threat, temptation to flee the jurisdiction would be too great to be resisted." 8 chanrobles virtual law library
The precise question however, is whether once the provisional liberty has been thus obtained, it could be terminated by the cancellation of the bail. In the answer filed on behalf of respondent Court, Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza did stress the absence of authority on the part of special counselor Antonio R. Robles who was not authorized to intervene in this case on behalf of the state but did so, his failure to object being the basis of the bail granted by the municipal court of Mulanay, Quezon. Such an allegation was denied by petitioner. We are not called upon to rule definitely on this aspect as independently thereof, there are two other basic objections. One was that petitioner, when the bail was granted, was still at large. The municipal court, therefore, could not have granted bail in accordance with our ruling in Feliciano v. Pasicolan. 9Thus: "'The constitutional mandate that all persons shall before conviction be bailable except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong, is subject to the limitation that the person applying for bail should be in custody of the law, or otherwise deprived of his liberty. The purpose of bail is to secure one's release and it would be incongruous as to grant bail to one who is free.'" 10Secondly, and what is worse, the prosecution was never given a chance to present its evidence. The authoritative doctrine in People v. San Diego 11is thus squarely in point: "Whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the Court should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process, and order of the Court granting bail should be considered void." 12 chanrobles virtual law library
Nor is the San Diego ruling novel. As far back as 1958, in People v. Raba, 13it was held: "Considering that Talantor did not serve notice of his motion to reduce bail on the provincial fiscal at least three days before the hearing thereof and the court failed to require that a reasonable notice thereof be given to said fiscal, it is evident that the court acted improperly in reducing the bail without giving the fiscal an opportunity to be heard" 14Just after San Diego, this Court had occasion to stress anew such a principle in People v. Bocar. 15As set forth in the opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes: "It cannot be denied that, under our regime of laws, and concomitant with the legal presumption of innocence before conviction, an accused is entitled to provisional liberty on bail, the only exception being when he is charged with a capital offense and the evidence of his guilt is strong. But even in the latter instance, the high regard reserved by the law for personal freedom is underscored by the provision placing upon the prosecution, not on the defense, the burden of proving that the accused is not entitled to bail. This protective attitude towards the sanctity of the liberty of a person notwithstanding, due process also demands that in the matter of bail the prosecution should be afforded full opportunity to present proof of the guilt of the accused. Thus, if it were true that the prosecution in this case was deprived of the right to present its evidence against the bail petition, or that the order granting such petition was issued upon incomplete evidence, then the issuance of the order would really constitute grave abuse of discretion that would call for the remedy of certiorari." 16 chanrobles virtual law library
The last sentence in the above excerpt finds application in the matter before us. No grave abuse of discretion yo justify the grant of the writ certiorari prayed for has been shown. That is why our resolution sought to be reconsidered should stand.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
3. That brings us to the point raised in the motion for reconsideration objecting to our dismissing the petition through a minute resolution. It is his contention that there should be an extended decision. As noted at the outset, reliance is had on the constitutional provision requiring a decision by a court of record to contain "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based." According to a recent decision, Jose v. Santos, 17what is expected of the judiciary "is that the decision rendered makes clear why either party prevailed under the applicable law to the facts as established. Nor is there any regid formula as to the language to be employed to satisfy the requirement of clarity and distinctness. The discretion of the particular judge in this respect, while not unlimited, is necessarily broad. There is no sacramental form of words which he must use upon pain of being considered as having failed to abide by what the Constitution directs." 18What must then be stressed is that under such a provision as held in the early case of Soncuya v. National Investment Board, 19the decision spoken of is the judgment rendered after the previous presentation of the proof in an ordinary civil or criminal case upon a stipulation of facts upon which its disposition is to be based. In Bacolod Murcia Milling Co., Inc. v. Henares, 20the above decision was cited with approval, with the opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes containing the following. "Plaintiff-appellant assigns as another error that the order appealed from does not contain any statement of the facts and the law on which it is based. Obviously, this is based on Section 1, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, and Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution. The contention is untenable, since these provisions have been held to refer only to decisions of the merit and not to orders of the trial court resolving incidental matters such as the one at bar." 21 chanrobles virtual law library
It is thus not self-evident that petitioner could justly lay claim to a grievance. For if the situation is subjected, to searching analysis, it cannot be denied that what is really involved is just a mere incident in the prosecution of petitioner Had he prevailed, he would have been entitled to provisionary liberty. Under the circumstances, as the facts of the clearly demonstrate, with the plea for habeas corpus be unavailing, we felt that a minute resolution which certainly would require less time than a full-blown decision, was not inappropriate. Precisely, the leniency shown the parties dwell at length on their respective contentions should disprove any suspicion that the decision arrived at was reached without according the parties the fundamental fairness to which they are entitled under the Constitution. Since, at the most, the relief sought by petitioner will not, in any way, foreclose the ultimate outcome of the cases against him one way or the other, we deemed that the constitutional provision invoked did not strictly call for application. In that sense, a minimum resolution certainly cannot be stigmatized as in any wise failing to abide by a constitutional command.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied, our resolution of January 26, 1973 dismissing the petitions for of merit reiterated and the temporary restraining order issue by us on October 16, 1973 lifted so that the case against petitioner can be duly heard forthwith. Without pronouncement as to costs.
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
chanrobles virtual law library
chanrobles virtual law library
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring: chanrobles virtual law library
I concur in this resolution of denial, and I am writing the separate concurring opinion only to further elucidate on why the minute resolution of January 26, 1973 dismissing petition in this case cannot be faulted for lack of fealty to the constitutional requirement relied upon by petitioner-movant that "(e)very decision of a court of record shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based", for the very simple reason that the same constitutional provision itself (Sec. 9 of Art. X) additionally provides that "(t)he Rules of Court shall govern the promulgation of minute resolutions", which in effect means that it is in the power of the Supreme Court to determine in every given case whether or not a minute resolution is sufficient to serve the best interests of justice, even if the same should amount to a final decision thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
I hold that it is a very short-sighted and impractical construction of this constitutional provision to maintain that the separate reference to a "decision" in its first sentence and to "minute resolutions" in the second sentence implies that the intention is to exclude the possibility of minute resolutions in rendering decisions. It is true that both aspects of the provision were conceived precisely to cure the anomaly of parties being left in the dark as to the real basis of the court in resolving their controversy, and, what is more important, to eliminate any possibility of abuse by judges whose decisions, if arbitrary, capricious or intentionally partial, would readily be exposed by the obvious salience of its inevitable lack of cogency and foundation, if a reasoned out decision were to be written by them. Besides, an unreasoned decision naturally makes it difficult for the aggrieved party to seek redress against it, since it would be like aiming at a moving or even invisible target. I am of the considered view, however, that it was never contemplated that cases involving purely procedural issues which do not directly affect the substantive rights of the parties should be subject to the laborious and time-consuming procedure consequent of such constitutional injunction. In other words, I refuse to believe that the constitutional fathers had in mind to apply it to matters which relate to mere technicalities of procedure or those that constitute nothing but incidents which do not directly affect the merits of the main substantive controversy or issue between the parties.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It must be borne in mind that what really delays very often the rendering of a decision by a court of record is the preparation thereof because of the time which generally has to be consumed not only in analyzing the evidence and marshalling the same in a written essay portraying the foundation, logic and precision of the ultimate conclusions of the court, but also in gathering and quoting or copying or, at least, paraphrasing therein the pertinent and relevant authorities, jurisprudence, statutes, rules, etc. Thus, it is easy to understand that to require that all these be done when the pivotal issue is purely procedural would only mean adding more to the delay in the final disposition of the merits of a case, rather than expediting the same. Actually, it is very rare that adjective matters call for the laying down of jurisprudence or jurisprudential rules or guidelines. Just imagine a case being the subject of reasoned out decisions not only of the trial court but also of the Court of Appeals and of this Court, only to be remanded to the lower court in order that the correct procedure may be followed, and this, not without the possibility of its bouncing back to the higher courts as regards other procedural points, leaving untouched in the meanwhile the real controversy. To allow that the cited constitutional mandate be in itself the possible cause of the unnecessary protraction of litigations is a plain absurdity. Indeed, it would be contrary to the obvious intent of the framers of the Constitution to do so.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the case at bar, it is true that the right of petitioner to bail is an important substantive right, but it just happens that, as it appears to us, the real bone of contention here is not whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the bail granted to him by the Municipal Court of Mulanay, Quezon, but whether or not the correct procedure for such a grant has been observed. There can be no question that such issue is purely procedural. The background circumstances extant in the record do not furnish adequate basis for determining, justly at this stage whether or not the evidence of guilt of petitioner available to the prosecution and which it is willing to present for the proper scrutiny of the court is strong. In fact, the stage for such determination has not yet been reached, as the respondent court correctly ruled. 1 chanrobles virtual law library
The original criminal complaint charging petitioner and his co-accused with triple murder and under which the bail in question here was granted had been ordered by the Supreme Court to be amended in order to charge them with three separate murders, and as it is too evident for any serious doubt that at the very least there consequently arose two new additional cases, apart from the first one, the issue of bail has to be necessarily started from the beginning insofar as these two new cases are concerned. It was, therefore, a purely procedural matter for the respondent court to require that, since the fiscal has not recommended bail in any of said cases, the regular procedure be followed of allowing the prosecution to prove that the evidence of guilt is strong, and until such proceeding has been held and terminated, any claim of right to bail is manifestly premature. While it is true that the amendment of the complaint in order to change the charge against petitioner from triple murder in one single case to three separate murder indictments in three respective distinct cases did not, as aptly contended by able counsel, alter the factual basis for determining the strength or weakness of the evidence of the prosecution, on the other hand, there is nothing to preclude modification of the subjective position of the prosecutor, should he opt to now reveal his strong evidence and place the same before the court, in attention to subsequent relevant developments warranting such a move, instead of maintaining his former pose, assuming this to have been the case, of not objecting to the grant of bail. And since the prosecution in this case has already announced it is now in a position to oppose the grant of bail, it is but proper that the procedure fixed by law for the purpose be adhered to. Accordingly, I cannot see how it can be contended that the respondent court had abused its discretion, in denying petitioner's petition for bail based exclusively on the findings of the municipal court in the original case, without prejudice to resolving the same later after the prosecution has had the opportunity to properly substantiate its opposition, a chance to which, it is now settled, it is entitled as a matter of law. And considering that the point involved is purely procedural, it was in the better interest of justice for the Court to issue the briefest decision in the form it has done. In any event, the difference between the minute resolution petitioner complains of and a decision in the usual form but succinctly stating that the petition is without merit, with one or two inconsequential words added to indicate the fundamental basis of such conclusion, can hardly be characterized as more than formal since petitioner's alleged right to bail has not been altogether denied and may still be claimed by him, albeit, I feel it would not have occasioned any harm had the court been a little more explicit - a norm that commends itself henceforth for instances similar to the one at bar.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
chanrobles virtual law library
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
I concur in this resolution of denial, and I am writing the separate concurring opinion only to further elucidate on why the minute resolution of January 26, 1973 dismissing petition in this case cannot be faulted for lack of fealty to the constitutional requirement relied upon by petitioner-movant that "(e)very decision of a court of record shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based", for the very simple reason that the same constitutional provision itself (Sec. 9 of Art. X) additionally provides that "(t)he Rules of Court shall govern the promulgation of minute resolutions", which in effect means that it is in the power of the Supreme Court to determine in every given case whether or not a minute resolution is sufficient to serve the best interests of justice, even if the same should amount to a final decision thereof.
I hold that it is a very short-sighted and impractical construction of this constitutional provision to maintain that the separate reference to a "decision" in its first sentence and to "minute resolutions" in the second sentence implies that the intention is to exclude the possibility of minute resolutions in rendering decisions. It is true that both aspects of the provision were conceived precisely to cure the anomaly of parties being left in the dark as to the real basis of the court in resolving their controversy, and, what is more important, to eliminate any possibility of abuse by judges whose decisions, if arbitrary, capricious or intentionally partial, would readily be exposed by the obvious salience of its inevitable lack of cogency and foundation, if a reasoned out decision were to be written by them. Besides, an unreasoned decision naturally makes it difficult for the aggrieved party to seek redress against it, since it would be like aiming at a moving or even invisible target. I am of the considered view, however, that it was never contemplated that cases involving purely procedural issues which do not directly affect the substantive rights of the parties should be subject to the laborious and time-consuming procedure consequent of such constitutional injunction. In other words, I refuse to believe that the constitutional fathers had in mind to apply it to matters which relate to mere technicalities of procedure or those that constitute nothing but incidents which do not directly affect the merits of the main substantive controversy or issue between the parties.
It must be borne in mind that what really delays very often the rendering of a decision by a court of record is the preparation thereof because of the time which generally has to be consumed not only in analyzing the evidence and marshalling the same in a written essay portraying the foundation, logic and precision of the ultimate conclusions of the court, but also in gathering and quoting or copying or, at least, paraphrasing therein the pertinent and relevant authorities, jurisprudence, statutes, rules, etc. Thus, it is easy to understand that to require that all these be done when the pivotal issue is purely procedural would only mean adding more to the delay in the final disposition of the merits of a case, rather than expediting the same. Actually, it is very rare that adjective matters call for the laying down of jurisprudence or jurisprudential rules or guidelines. Just imagine a case being the subject of reasoned out decisions not only of the trial court but also of the Court of Appeals and of this Court, only to be remanded to the lower court in order that the correct procedure may be followed, and this, not without the possibility of its bouncing back to the higher courts as regards other procedural points, leaving untouched in the meanwhile the real controversy. To allow that the cited constitutional mandate be in itself the possible cause of the unnecessary protraction of litigations is a plain absurdity. Indeed, it would be contrary to the obvious intent of the framers of the Constitution to do so.
In the case at bar, it is true that the right of petitioner to bail is an important substantive right, but it just happens that, as it appears to us, the real bone of contention here is not whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the bail granted to him by the Municipal Court of Mulanay, Quezon, but whether or not the correct procedure for such a grant has been observed. There can be no question that such issue is purely procedural. The background circumstances extant in the record do not furnish adequate basis for determining, justly at this stage whether or not the evidence of guilt of petitioner available to the prosecution and which it is willing to present for the proper scrutiny of the court is strong. In fact, the stage for such determination has not yet been reached, as the respondent court correctly ruled. 1
The original criminal complaint charging petitioner and his co-accused with triple murder and under which the bail in question here was granted had been ordered by the Supreme Court to be amended in order to charge them with three separate murders, and as it is too evident for any serious doubt that at the very least there consequently arose two new additional cases, apart from the first one, the issue of bail has to be necessarily started from the beginning insofar as these two new cases are concerned. It was, therefore, a purely procedural matter for the respondent court to require that, since the fiscal has not recommended bail in any of said cases, the regular procedure be followed of allowing the prosecution to prove that the evidence of guilt is strong, and until such proceeding has been held and terminated, any claim of right to bail is manifestly premature. While it is true that the amendment of the complaint in order to change the charge against petitioner from triple murder in one single case to three separate murder indictments in three respective distinct cases did not, as aptly contended by able counsel, alter the factual basis for determining the strength or weakness of the evidence of the prosecution, on the other hand, there is nothing to preclude modification of the subjective position of the prosecutor, should he opt to now reveal his strong evidence and place the same before the court, in attention to subsequent relevant developments warranting such a move, instead of maintaining his former pose, assuming this to have been the case, of not objecting to the grant of bail. And since the prosecution in this case has already announced it is now in a position to oppose the grant of bail, it is but proper that the procedure fixed by law for the purpose be adhered to. Accordingly, I cannot see how it can be contended that the respondent court had abused its discretion, in denying petitioner's petition for bail based exclusively on the findings of the municipal court in the original case, without prejudice to resolving the same later after the prosecution has had the opportunity to properly substantiate its opposition, a chance to which, it is now settled, it is entitled as a matter of law. And considering that the point involved is purely procedural, it was in the better interest of justice for the Court to issue the briefest decision in the form it has done. In any event, the difference between the minute resolution petitioner complains of and a decision in the usual form but succinctly stating that the petition is without merit, with one or two inconsequential words added to indicate the fundamental basis of such conclusion, can hardly be characterized as more than formal since petitioner's alleged right to bail has not been altogether denied and may still be claimed by him, albeit, I feel it would not have occasioned any harm had the court been a little more explicit - a norm that commends itself henceforth for instances similar to the one at bar.
Endnotes:
1 Article VIII, Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution. As now worded in the present Constitution, it reads: "Every decision of a court of record shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based. The Rules of Court shall govern the promulgation of minute resolution." Article X, Section 9.
2 According to Article III, Section 1, paragraph 3 of the 1935 Constitution: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." The above provision has been substantially reproduced in the present Constitution, Article IV, Section 3, with the modification that a warrant of arrest is specifically mentioned and a "responsible officer, may, if provided for by law, caused it to be issued."
3 L-33393, May 18, 1972, 45 SCRA 56.
4 Cf. Gumabon v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, L-300226 January 30,1971, 37 SCRA 420.
5 99 Phil. 515 (1956).
6 Ibid, 551.
7 September 17, 1971, 41 SCRA 1.
8 Ibid, 6-7.
9 L-14657, July 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 888.
10 Answer, par. 3(cc), 6.
11 L-29676, December 24, 1968, 26 SCRA 522.
12 Ibid, 522-523.
13 103 Phil. 384.
14 Ibid, 386.
15 L-27120, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 512.
16 Ibid, 516.
17 L-25510, October 30, 1970, 35 SCRA 538.
18 Ibid, 542.
19 69 Phil. 602 (1940).
20 107 Phil. 560 (1960).
21 Ibid, 570.
BARREDO, J., concurring.
1 We cannot fail but note the jurisdictional infirmity of the proceedings originally held by the Municipal Court arising from its having acted without first acquiring jurisdiction over the person of the accused who had not yet been placed in its custody whether by actual arrest or voluntary surrender.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15473 June 30, 1961
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. LIBERATO GAGUI, ET AL., defendants. EUSEBIO V. NAVARRO, Respondent.
DE LEON, J.: chanrobles virtual law library
On November 8, 1957, when Criminal Case No. 2193 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga was called for trial, Atty. Eusebio V. Navarro, counsel of record for one of the accused, failed to appear and forthwith the court issued an order, which is quoted verbatim as follows:
By virtue of the order dated October 8, 1957, the assignment of this case was set for today, November 8, 1957. Present were Fiscal Pedro S. David and counsel, Mr. Ahmed Garcia, for the accused Arsenio Mangila.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Attached to the record is an urgent motion for postponement filed by Mr. Eusebio Navarro, counsel for the other accused Liberato Gagui, alleging that he cannot attend to this case, as he is engaged in a civil case in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The record clearly shows that when the trial was set for November 8, 1957, it was done in open court and after consultation with Mr. Navarro. As a matter of fact, the court ordered the detail of a Tagalog interpreter. The said interpreter is also present.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The reasons given by Mr. Navarro are not satisfactory. Mr. Navarro is fully aware of the fact that this case has been pending for a considerable length of time. He should have, therefore, given priority to this case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby imposes a fine of P100.00 upon Mr. Navarro for delaying this criminal case. The court announces in advance that it will not reconsider this order.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Reset the trial on January 7, 1958, at 9:00 o'clock in the morning.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Let a copy of this order be served upon the Department of Justice for the detail again of the Tagalog interpreter on the said date.
In another order issued on November 16, 1957, the above quoted order was amended by providing in the dispositive part thereof that "in the event that Mr. Navarro fails to pay the fine of P100.00 he shall suffer a subsidiary imprisonment not to exceed five (5) days." Subsequently, on December 2, 1957, the lower court issued still another order warning Atty. Navarro "that if he fails to pay the said fine on or before December 14, 1957, the court will order his arrest and confinement." chanrobles virtual law library
From the three orders above referred to, Atty. Eusebio V. Navarro has interposed the present appeal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It would appear that for the absence from court of the appellant Atty. Navarro when Criminal Case No. 2193, in which he was counsel of record for one of the accused, was called for trial, the lower court summarily adjudged him guilty of direct contempt and sentenced him to pay a fine under penalty of imprisonment if he fails to do so within a given period.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In our opinion, the contempt supposed to have been committed by appellant is not a direct contempt so as to be summarily punishable under section 1 of Rule 64, for it is not a misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. If any contempt occurred he failure of said appellant to appear for trial under the circumstances mentioned in the order of November 8, 1957 complained of, it would be an indirect contempt, punishable only after written charge and hearing, under section 3 of the same Rule 64, paragraph (b) of which mentions "disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or judge." As held in the case of Rivera vs. Arellano (83 Phil. 744) -
. . . failure or refusal of an accused or of his attorney to appear from trial comes closer to the definition of indirect contempt in paragraph (b) of section 3 (Rule 64) than to a misbehavior in the presence of or near the court contemplated in Section 1.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In State vs. Winthrop, 148 Wash., 526 P. 793; 59 A.L.R. 1265, it was held that the unexcused absence of an attorney from the court when a case in which he was attorney of record for one of the parties was called for trial is not a contempt occurring in the presence or view of the court, so as to be summarily punishable, but contempt therein, if any occurred, away from, and out of, the presence of the court, and he is not subject to discipline and punishment, other than by a charge being first made against him substantially as required by statute.' (Footnote, 12 Am. Jur. Sec. 11, p. 396).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In Finnick vs. Peterson, 6 Phil. 172, this Court said: 'A witness who fails or refuses to comply with a subpoena duces tecum is guilty of contempt. Such contempt is not committed in the presence of the court, even though, upon appearance of the witness, the court should make a verbal order commanding him to comply with the terms of the subpoena. Such a witness can not be punished summarily. He is entitled to the hearing provided for under sections 232-240 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions. (See also Francisco vs. Enriquez, G. R. No. L-7058, March 20, 1954.) .
It clearly appearing that no charge in writing for contempt has been filed against herein appellant, nor An opportunity given to him to be heard by himself or counsel, Are find and so hold that the lower court acted in excess if not in grave abuse, of its jurisdiction in proceeding against and declaring said appellant guilty of contempt. (See. 3, Rule 64; Nava vs. Teodoro, et al., G.R. No. L-10074, April 30, 1959).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Having arrived at the above conclusion, we deem it unnecessary to pass upon the other questions raised by appellant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the orders complained of are hereby set aside. So ordered without costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla , Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Natividad, JJ., concur. Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 86938 March 22, 1991
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. DANTE BANAYO, accused-appellant.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
The accused-appellant, Dante Banayo, was charged with the crime of rape in Criminal Case No. 4474-SP before the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 31, San Pablo City. The complaint filed in said case on October 11, 1985 reads, as follows (p. 1, Rollo):
The undersigned Complainant and 3rd Assistant City Fiscal accuse DANTE BANAYO of the crime of RAPE, defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about August 4, 1985, in the City of San Pablo, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused abovenamed with lewd design, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rape and have sexual relations with undersigned complainant ANSELMA MAGAMPON, by hitting her at the head thereby making her unconscious and then had sexual intercourse with her.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon being arraigned on November 28, 1985, the accused-appellant entered the plea of not guilty to the offense charged. After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered its decision on March 7, 1988, the dispositive portion of which, reads (p. 75, Rollo):
WHEREFORE, the Court finds DANTE BANAYO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape, as defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, and imposes upon him the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, with all the accessory penalties provided for by law; to indemnify Anselma Magampon in the sum of P20,000.00; and pay the costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
The version of the plaintiff-appellee was summarized by the trial court, as follows (pp. 71-73, Rollo):
. . .: The victim, Anselma Magampon, 21 years old, single, was a waitress at Solid Cafe, a restaurant situated at San Pedro Street, San Pablo City. On August 4, 1985, at about 8:00 o'clock (should be 10 o'clock) in the evening, she was walking on her way home to Triangulo, Brgy. San Gabriel, San Pablo City. She was alone and had just come from work. While walking by the side of the premises of Franklin Baker Company, Philippines, she was hit on her head from behind and when she looked back, she saw the accused Dante Banayo. She was about to run when she was hit again on the head. She lapsed into unconsciousness and could not recall anything thereafter. Upon regaining her senses, she found herself lying down at the foot of a banana plant. There is a mango tree nearby on the north; on the left were banana plants and near the fence were folliage (sic) of thick grasses. She found the place to be in Teomora Subdivision, San Gabriel, San Pablo City, about 350 to 400 meters away from the house of her father, where she resides. Her panty and pants were down to her heels. Traumatized by the experience she got up, pulled her panty and pants up and walked groggily to her house, her head and genital organs (sic) bleeding.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
When she arrived in her house her father, Francisco Magampon, was still awake. Seeing her in that condition her father asked what happened to her. She was not able to give a comprehensive answer because she has not fully regained her senses, She was bruised and felt pain over all. (sic) her body. Francisco requested a neighbor, Crispin Fule, to bring Anselma to the hospital and from his house, Francisco went to the Police Precinct near the San Pablo City Public Market to make a report. After making the report he went with a policeman to the San Pablo City District Hospital, arriving at the hospital about 2:00 o'clock the next morning, August 5, 1985. Anselma was treated and examined thoroughly by Dra. Nora Peñaloza. she issued a Medico-Legal Certificate, Exhibit "C'. As per medical certificate the findings were the following: chanrobles virtual law library
P.E.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
1. Bleeding wound (2) about 3 cm. in length, occiput; chanrobles virtual law library
2. Hematoma: chanrobles virtual law library
-Both arms, lateral aspect, about 4 x 3 cm.; chanrobles virtual law library
-anterior chest wall near the left breast, about 4 x 4 cm.; chanrobles virtual law library
-posterior chest wall (back) 5 x 4 cm.; chanrobles virtual law library
-both anterior-thighs, about 8 x 4 em; chanrobles virtual law library
6. Hymen not intact, old lacerations at 6 and 9 o'clock positions. Hymenal tears edematous.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
According to Dra. Peñaloza, the bleeding wound at the occiput could have been caused by a blunt instrument, like a fall and the head coming in contract with a hard object. The hematoma or swollen portions of the skin are caused by extra vaciation (sic) of blood vessels . . . . Dra. Peñaloza further declared that the hymen was inflamed, secondary secondary (sic) to trauma; that the examination of Anselma's vagina was negative for spermatozoa and that she was no longer a virgin.
xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library
Anselma was discharged from the hospital after three days. One week after her discharge she and her father went to the place where she was molested and indicated to him the exact place where she was after she regained consciousness on the night of August 4, 1985.
On the part of the accused-appellant, he testified that (p. 73, Rollo):
. . . he courted Anselma Magampon and in the end he was able to secure her love and they became sweethearts in July, 1985. She was a waitress at the Solid Cafe in San Pablo City, when he first met her and he was a storekeeper at a store near the Solid Cafe owned by one Yolanda Bautista. This relationship resulted into several sexual intercourses. Later on, the accused appeared to have cooled off and Anselma Magampon, noticing the dry treatment asked the accused to marry him. He told her that he was not yet in a position to marry her. She became angry and she threatened him. Later on the father of Anselma talked to him and told him to marry Anselma. He told him that he was not yet ready to marry Anselma.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
He denied that he hit her in the head while she was walking on August 4, 1985 at 10:00 o'clock in the evening because he was in Barangay Palakpakin in the evening of August 4, 1985, in the house of his baptismal sponsor, Ayong Atienza; that, in fact he had been staying in the house of Ayong Atienza since July, 1985.
As in most appeals in rape cases, the issue raised involve the credibility of the victim. Here is one instance. The accused-appellant assigns a single error committed by the trial court, that is (p. 5, Brief for the accused-appellant; p. 86 Rollo):
The Honorable Trial Court erred in holding that the inconsistencies, contradictions and improbabilities in complainant's testimony as merely minor which do not affect her credibility.
In support thereto, he alleges that ". . ., the testimony of complainant is punctuated, if not riddled, with material and gross inconsistencies, contradictions, lies and improbabilities which render incredible her story and cast a serious doubt on the veracity of her complaint." (ibid)
We shall enumerate the inconsistencies referred to by the accused-appellant and, at the same time, rule on them: chanrobles virtual law library
(1) Private complainant categorically asserted that prior to the incident in question, she never had any sexual intercourse with a man. However, this was belied by the Medico-Legal Certificate wherein it was stated, inter alia, that her "hymen (was) not intact, (with) old lacerations at 6 and 9 o'clock positions," supra, and the testimony of the attending physician that this finding indicates that there was a previous contact.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Although there exists a discrepancy between the claim of private complainant that prior to August 4, 1985, she never had any sexual relations with any man (p. 6, tsn, August 26, 1986), on one hand, and the Medico Legal Certificate and the testimony of the attending physician that ". . ., the fact that I stated here that the hymen is no longer intact of (sic) old lacerations at 6 and 9 o'clock positions indicates that there was a previous contact" (p. 6, tsn, May 1 9, 1987), on the other hand, this does not render private complainant's testimony less credible (People v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 80228, September 12, 1988, 165 SCRA 302). Inconsistency on matters of minor details, like in this case, does not detract from the actual fact of rape (People v. Cayago, G.R. No. L-47398, March 14, 1988, 158 SCRA 586; People v. Aragon, G.R. No. 51736, August 4, 1988, 164 SCRA 78; People v. Partulan, G.R. No. 75294, December 14, 1987, 156 SCRA 489). It must be stressed once more that virginity is not an essential element of the crime of rape. We even said in the case of People v. Hortillano, G.R. No. 71116, September 19, 1989, 177 SCRA 729, that the fact that the victim has had several sexual liaisons will not rule out the crime of rape.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
2) The attending physician admitted on cross-examination that despite a thorough physical examination conducted on private complainant, she found no evidence of any spermatozoa.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The absence of spermatozoa in the vagina or thereabouts does not negate the commission of rape. The important consideration in rape is penetration and not emission (People v. Abonada, G.R. No. 50041, January 27, 1989, 169 SCRA 530; People v. Tabago, G.R. No. 69778, November 8, 1988, 167 SCRA 65; People v. Selfaison, 110 Phil. 839; People v. Ludovice, et al., G.R. No. L-34986, March 23, 1984, 128 SCRA 361; People v. Felix, et al., G.R. Nos. 62281-82, July 16, 1984,130 SCRA 456; People v. Calimquim, G.R. No. 61255, October 28, 1983, 125 SCRA 499; People v. Ando, G.R. No. 81403, December 20, 1989, 180 SCRA 412). It may be that the sperm cells were emitted outside the vagina (People v. Eclarinal, et al., G.R. No. 83308, February 12, 1990, 182 SCRA 106). Or, the non-appearance of spermatozoa in the vagina of private complainant could be due to the lack of ejaculation on the part of the accused-appellant (People v. Somera, G.R. No. L-47275, February 21, 1989, 170 SCRA 428). The fact of penetration was established by the testimony of private complainant that when she regained consciousness, her vagina ached most and it was bleeding:
Q Can you tell us what particular part of your body was hacked (sic) most at the time, if any? chanrobles virtual law library
A My vaginal organ (harap).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Q And why did you say it was aching? chanrobles virtual law library
A That is what I felt.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Besides the bleeding from (sic) your head, was there any other part of your body which bleed? (sic) chanrobles virtual law library
A Yes, sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Q What else? chanrobles virtual law library
A My genital organ was also bleeding. (p.6, tsn, July 24, 1986)
This was corroborated by the findings in the Medico-Legal Certificate and the testimony of the attending physician.
Q Now, under No. 3, another finding, there is (sic) old lacerations at 6 o'clock of the hymen which you also stated that the same is not intact, now in layman's language what is hymenal tears edematous? chanrobles virtual law library
A It is no longer intact due to old lacerations but the hymenal tears edematous, it means "namamaga o paga". It means secondary to trauma. (p. 4, tsn, May 19, 1987)
3) The presence of hematoma on both arms, thighs and chest indicates, according to the attending physician, signs of physical struggle. This is contradictory to the testimony of private complainant that she was unconscious during the time that she was raped.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The attending physician testified in the direct examination that:
Q Now, hematoma on both arms, on the chest wall both anterior and posterior and on both thighs which are all anterior, would you be able to tell also the Court would (sic) have had caused this hematoma? chanrobles virtual law library
WITNESS chanrobles virtual law library
A Hematoma in layman's term is "pasa." It means swollen which have been inflicted by someone. It is due to extra vacessation. Extra vacessation of clotted blood secondary to breakage of capillaries. Capillaries are small blood vessels in the body.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
FISCAL GAJITOS chanrobles virtual law library
Q Would you beable (sic) to indicate also that this hematoma could have been caused by struggle? chanrobles virtual law library
A It could be, struggle is trauma. (pp. 4-5, tsn, May 19, 1987).
On cross-examination regarding this subject matter, she testified that:
Q Now, in findings No. 2, where you indicated hematoma on the arms, as well as on the thighs, that would indicate what you have already stated, Doctors, that those were signs of physical struggle? chanrobles virtual law library
A Physical struggle. (p. 6, May 19, 1987)
Correlating her testimony in the cross-examination with her testimony in the direct examination, there was no categorical statement made by her that the presence of hematomas on the different parts of private complainant's body were signs of physical struggle. On the contrary, she only stated in the direct examination the probability that these have been caused by struggle. Her statement in the cross-examination should be understood in this light. We are in conformity with the observations made by the Solicitor General that the hematomas could have also resulted because the private complainant fell on the ground when she was rendered unconscious by the blows on her head by the accused-appellant, or because she was probably dragged by the accused-appellant from the place where she was hit on the head and rendered unconscious to the place where she regained consciousness, or because the accused-appellant forced himself upon her.
4) In the position where private complainant's pants and panty were pulled down to her heels, a rapist would find it very inconvenient, if not difficult and unpleasurable, to penetrate the victim. If, indeed, the accused-appellant raped private complainant, it would be most unnatural for him to subject himself to difficulty when he could have easily removed private complainant's pants and panty, they being in a deserted place and he had all the time in the world.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Apparently, the accused-appellant failed to read the testimony of private complainant in full. Her account when she regained consciousness was, as follows:
Q Where were you when you regained consciousness? chanrobles virtual law library
A When I regained consciousness I was already at the foot of a banana tree and I noticed that my pants were down including my panty. (p. 6, tsn, July 24, 1986)
The questions propounded by the trial court clarified this testimony of private complainant:
Q When you said that you regained consciousness under a banana tree and you said that your panty and trousers were brought down up to your ankles, were your two legs inside the pants that you were wearing? chanrobles virtual law library
A It was pulled down and I found it at the side of my feet. It was taken away from my feet.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Q Why did you testify that your pants and your panty were down to your ankles and you said now that your feet were free from the pants and the panty? chanrobles virtual law library
A I never said something like that, your Honor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Q You stated at Question No. 7 of this statement you gave to the police on August 4, 1985 that the pants and panty you were wearing were . . . nakababa hanggang sa paanan ko.... could you explain that phrase? chanrobles virtual law library
A It was pulled down and I saw the panty and the pants near my feet.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Q Are you telling us that these items were completely removed from your body? chanrobles virtual law library
A Yes, your Honor. (p. 13, tsn, August 26, 1986).
5) As borne out by the testimony of private complainant, the side of Franklin Baker was lighted and illuminated by several electric posts. No person in his right mind, intending to commit a crime, would do so in a well-lighted place where he could easily be identified.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Private complainant testified that it was at 10:00 o'clock in the evening when she was hit on the head (pp. 4-5, tsn, July 24, 1986). At this time of night, it is normal for people in the provinces to be inside their houses and already asleep. It is of common knowledge that rural folks retire earlier than city dwellers. This explains why the incident passed unnoticed (People v. Germino, et al., G.R. No. 65424, December 26,1984, 133 SCRA 827).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
6) Private complainant gave her statement to the police only on August 13, 1985 or more than a week after the occurrence of the alleged incident. This delay in giving her statement to the police, which delay was not at all justified subjected to serious doubt her motive in instituting the complaint.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We do not believe that a negative implication should be drawn from private complainant's failure to give her statement to the police immediately. The delay in reporting the incident to the authorities is not an indication of a fabricated charge taking into account the fact that immediately after the incident, private complainant took the earliest opportunity to have herself examined physically, driven to take this step by the grievous outrage she must have felt after having been sexually attacked (People v. Tamayao, G.R. No. 56699, January 28, 1983, 120 SCRA 412). It has long been held that no young Filipina of decent repute would publicly admit that she had been criminally abused and ravished unless that is the truth. It is her natural instinct to protect her honor (People v. Cruz, Sr., G.R. No. 71462, June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA 609, cited in People v. Bulosan, G.R. No. 58404, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 492). Considering the inbred modesty and antipathy of a Filipino woman to air in public things that affect her honor, it is hard to conceive that private complainant would assume and admit the ignominy she had undergone if this were not true (People v. Angsiako, G.R. No. L-44223, August 30, 1984, 131 SCRA 482 cited in People v. Mustacisa, G.R. No. 51777, March 25, 1988, 159 SCRA 227).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
7) Private complainant failed to immediately identify her alleged assailant. It was only after she was discharged from the hospital that she informed her father of what allegedly happened.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Private complainant's failure to inform her father immediately concerning the identity of the accused-appellant and the incident that happened was satisfactorily explained by her. According to her, she was very dizzy and her whole body ached:
Q And you want to convey to his Court that during the entire time that you were confined at the hospital, you were very dizzy? chanrobles virtual law library
A Yes, sir. (p. 9, tsn, August 26, 1986)
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, you stated again on cross examination that you were able to reach home after regarding consciousness at Teomora Subdivision but that you did not tell anybody as to what happened to you, why did you not tell anybody what happened to you? chanrobles virtual law library
A Because at that time sir, I was very dizzy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Q What was your physical condition at the time aside from being dizzy? chanrobles virtual law library
A My whole body was very painful.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Q You also stated that you saw your father at your house at the time that you arrived, is that so? chanrobles virtual law library
A Yes, sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Q Do you remember being asked by anybody in your household as to what happened to you?
A They were asking me but I was not able to answer them because I was so dizzy, sir. (p. 12, tsn, August 26, 1986)
8) During the entire length of private complainant's testimony, she never used the word "rape" to describe what happened to her. She merely stated that she was "molested" which is totally different in legal meaning from "rape." chanrobles virtual law library
That is not so. To be precise, neither did private complainant use the word "molested" to describe what happened to her. Actually, she merely replied to the interrogations of the fiscal and the counsel of the accused-appellant who used the words molested, sexually molested, assaulted, raped, interchangeably in narrating the incident.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
9) Private complainant testified that the crime was committed in Teomora Subdivision but in her sworn statement to the police she stated that the clime took place inside a house at PNR Compound, San Pablo City.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is obvious that the accused-appellant deliberately omitted to read private complainant's sworn statement in its entirety. He confined his argument only on the fifth question therein:
T Kailan at saan nangyari and bagay na ito? chanrobles virtual law library
S Noong Linggo ng gabi, ika-4 ng Agosto 1985, ang oras ay humigit (sic) alas 10:00 ng gabi, duon sa isang bahay sa PNR Compound, Lunsod na ito. (Exhibit B)
This statement, by itself, contradicts private complainant's testimony in court that the rape incident happened at Teomora Subdivision. However, private complainant expounded this prior statement in her answer to the seventh question in the same sworn statement:
T Papaano naman nagawa sa iyo ang bagay na ito?
S Naglalakad po ako nuon duon sa may tagiliran ng PNR compound, malapit sa Franklin Baker, ngayon po ay may bigla na lamang pumalo sa aking ulo, at iyong aking lingon ay nakita ko na si Dante pala ang pumalo sa akin, tapos po ay akma sana akong tatakbo, nang ako ay paluing muli sa ulo nitong si Dante, at hindi ko na po alam ang nangyari at nang ako ay magising ay nasa tabi na ako ng isang punong saging sa may Teomora Village, Lunsod na ito, na nakababa hanggang sa may paa ko iyong aking suot na pantalon pati na iyong aking suot na panty ay nakababa rin hanggang sa may paanan ko. (ibid)
Summing up, the arguments that the accused-appellant presented were inadequate to tilt the scale in his favor. He failed to destroy the credibility of private complainant. There is no cogent reason to depart from the well-settled rule that the findings of fact of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses should be accorded the highest respect because it has the advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses and can discern if a witness is telling the truth (People v. Orita, G.R. No. 88724, April 3, 1990, 184 SCRA 105; People v. Samson, G.R. No. 55520, August 25, 1989, 176 SCRA 710). We quote with favor the trial court's finding regarding the testimony of private complainant (pp. 73-74, Rollo):
. . . The version of the complainant bears all the earmarks of spontaneity, candidness and credibility. Thus, immediately after she was hit two times by the accused on the head, she lapsed into unconsciousness and when she regained her senses she was alone in a deserted place with her pants and panty down to her heels. She knew then that she was raped because of the pains she feel (sic) all over her body. She was able to walk home nonetheless even in a groggy condition. It is understandable that she was not able to tell her father immediately what happened to her not only because of her traumatic experience but also because of the pains she was enduring and she has not also fully recovered her senses. She was however brought to the hospital and fully examined by Dra. Peñaloza. Her tell-tale injuries are mute testimony of the fact that she was indeed raped. . . . Equally important is the complainant's disclosure in open court of her tragedy and also her revelation to the doctor who treated her, which led to an examination of her private parts and lay her open to risks of future public ridicule. Arrayed against all these evidences is the bare denial of the accused and the claim that she is his sweetheart, corroborated by his witness Luzviminda Bautista. We cannot accept the defense of denial against the testimony of Anselma which had the ring of truth all throughout. . . .
The bare contention of the accused-appellant that the complaint was the handiwork of a woman who was spurned by her lover by refusing to marry her after she had yielded her body and soul does not inspire belief Private respondent would not expose herself to the ordeal of a public trial if she were not motivated solely by a desire to have the accused-appellant who had ravished and shamed her placed behind bars. Neither is the accused-appellant's defense of alibi tenable. It was not corroborated by Ayong Atienza, the person in whose house he was allegedly staying at the time. Besides, it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime (People v. Villapando, G.R. No. 73656, October 5, 1989, 178 SCRA 341; People v. Yeban, et al., G.R. Nos. 90279-81, October 11, 1990) because Barangay Palakpakin is just less than an hour ride to Solid Cafe (p. 7, tsn, June 25, 1987) and Solid Cafe was just less than a kilometer to the place where the rape was committed (see p. 4, tsn, July 24, 1986). Moreover, the accused-appellant was positively identified by private complainant (People v. Villapando, supra):
Q How did you know that it was Dante Banayo when you said he came from behind when he hit you on the head? chanrobles virtual law library
A Because when I looked back it was he whom I saw.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Q What was the condition of the place with respect to visibility when you were hit on the head by Dante Banayo? chanrobles virtual law library
A It was bright in that place because of the light, sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Q Where was the light coming from and what kind of light? chanrobles virtual law library
A The side of the Franklin Baker has bulbs every side of the Franklin Baker.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Q What happened to you when you were hit on the head by Dante Banayo? chanrobles virtual law library
A I was able to run when I was hit again on the head by Dante Banayo. (p. 5, tsn, July 24, 1986)
Aside from this, private complainant could not have been mistaken in identifying the accused-appellant because he was her customer at Solid Cafe:
Q Going back to Dante Banayo before that incident, did you know Dante Banayo? chanrobles virtual law library
A Yes, sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Q How well did you know him? chanrobles virtual law library
A I knew him because he was my customer at the Solid Cafe.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Q How long had he been your customer at the Solid Cafe before August 4, 1985? chanrobles virtual law library
A More or less one (1) month, sir. (p. 7, Ibid.)
We, therefore, find that the guilt of the accused-appellant for the crime of rape has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modification that the civil indemnity is increased to P40,000.00.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 132484-85. November 15, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. GEORGE DE LEON (acquitted), JULLIVER DE LEON, accused,
JULLIVER DE LEON, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J.:
Before us on appeal is the decision[1 dated November 6, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 72, in Criminal Case No. 17806-MN finding appellant Julliver de Leon guilty of violation of Section 16, Article III of RA 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000).
Initially, appellant Julliver de Leon was arrested and charged[2 together with his father, co-accused George de Leon, with the crime of illegal sale of regulated drugs in violation of Section 15, Article III of RA 6425, as amended, in an Information that read:
That on or about the 19th day of March 1997, in Malabon Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with one another, being private persons and without authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver in consideration of the amount of P10,000.00 to a poseur buyer white crystalline substance contained in two (2) separate sealed transparent plastic bag each with markings BB/AGN-97/A and BB/AGH-97/B with a total net weight of 5.1846 gram and 5.5693 gram respectively, which substance when subjected to chemistry examination gave positive results for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride otherwise known as shabu which are regulated drugs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3
They were also charged[4 with illegal possession of regulated drugs, in violation of Section 16, Article III of RA 6425, as amended, in an Information that read:
That on or about the 19th day of March 1997, in Malabon Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, being private persons and without authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, custody and control white crystalline substance contained in four (4) separate transparent plastic bags marked R-MPM-1, R-MPM-2, R-MPM-3 and R-MPM-4 with a total net weight of 48.70 gram, 99.40 gram, 94.40 gram and 4.7556 grams respectively, which substance when subjected to chemistry examination gave positive results for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride otherwise known as shabu which are regulated drugs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5
Upon arraignment on May 28, 1997, both accused pleaded not guilty to both charges and the trial ensued.
The evidence of the prosecution showed that, after a month of surveillance on a person named Jojie, who turned out to be accused George de Leon, for illegal drug trafficking, the Drugs Enforcement Group of the Malabon Police Station decided to conduct a buy-bust operation on the said accused.
Prosecution witness Ronald Ticlao, the police-aide who acted as the poseur-buyer for the operation, testified that, prior to the operation, he received ten pieces of marked one thousand peso bills which were photocopied. The serial numbers of the bills were also entered in the dispatch book. He was accompanied by a confidential informer named Nora Boysillo to transact with accused George de Leon. In going to the designated place of operation, he and Nora boarded a tricycle and alighted in front of accused de Leons residence along Kaunlaran St., Muzon, Malabon, Metro Manila.[6
Upon entering the compound, Nora Boysillo introduced Ticlao to accused George de Leon. George asked how much money they had with them and the quantity of drugs that they wanted to buy. Ticlao answered that he wanted to purchase dalawang bulto. George then asked for the money and Nora Boysillo gave him the ten pieces of marked one thousand peso bills. After counting the money, George called his son, herein appellant Julliver Baye de Leon. When the appellant came out of the house, George told him to give the desired quantity of shabu to Ticlao and Boysillo. George thereafter handed the money to the appellant and then left the compound, telling Ticlao and Boysillo that the appellant would handle the transaction. Herein appellant then entered the house from which George came out. When he emerged from the said house, he was holding a yellowish envelope. He took two plastic sachets from the said envelope and handed them to Boysillo. Ticlao took one of the sachets and examined its contents. After verifying that what was given to him was shabu, Ticlao gave the pre-arranged signal to the policemen who were then observing the proceedings from outside the compound. Then, Ticlao and Boysillo left, and the police operatives met them as they were leaving the compound.[7
After the pre-arranged signal was given, police officers Alberto Nepomuceno, Rogelio Libuton, Rojas, Cruz, Maalac and Borda entered the compound to arrest appellant Julliver de Leon. On seeing them, the appellant ran inside his fathers house. Libuton followed the appellant and saw him throw a yellowish envelope inside the bedroom where he entered and hid. Libuton picked up the envelope, looked inside and found four transparent plastic sachets containing shabu. He turned over the envelope to police officer Melvin Maalac. He and Maalac affixed their signatures and the date of recovery on the envelope. They also marked the four sachets inside the said envelope.
During the trial, Ticlao identified the two accused, the buy-bust shabu, the confiscated shabu, the pertinent entries in the police blotter containing the serial numbers of the marked money bills, the yellowish envelope from which Baye took the buy-bust shabu and the markings thereon.[8
SPO 1 Rogelio Libuton also identified their signatures and the date they wrote on the envelope, and their markings on the sachets, as the exact markings they made during the operation. They identified the marked bills as the same bills used during the operation; they were the same bills whose serial numbers were entered in the dispatch book and photocopied.[9
SPO 1 Alberto Nepomuceno and SPO 1 Rogelio Libuton corroborated the testimony of Ticlao. Furthermore, they testified that, in going to the place of operation, they used a Tamaraw FX vehicle, an owner-type jeep and a tricycle in which Ticlao and Boysillo rode. When George left the compound while the transaction was taking place, Nepomuceno ordered police officers Querubin and Agustin to follow George.[10
SPO1 Benjamin Querubin testified that he and SPO2 Agustin followed accused George de Leon right after he left Ticlao and Boysillo in the middle of the negotiation. Later on, Querubin received a radio message from SPO 1 Nepomuceno ordering him to arrest accused George de Leon who was by then having a drinking session with his friends about 200 meters from his house.[11
The buy-bust white crystalline substance[12 and the confiscated white crystalline substance[13 were sent to a forensic chemist for laboratory examination[14 and were found to be the regulated drug[15 known as shabu.
For their defense, accused George and herein appellant denied that an entrapment operation took place.
Defense witness Geoffrey Santos, a tricycle driver plying the Concepcion-Muzon route, testified that, between two and three oclock in the afternoon of March 19, 1997, three men whom he discovered later were policemen boarded his tricycle and directed him to go to Kaunlaran Street with two other tricycles. The tricycles unloaded the passengers in front of the gate of the residence of the accused. They entered the gate then drew their firearms. He denied seeing any female who accompanied the policemen nor seeing a Tamaraw FX vehicle along the street.[16
Defense witnesses Helen Navarro and Vicente Martin, neighbors of the accused, corroborated the testimony of Santos. Martin added that he knew the persons who boarded the tricycles were police officers because he recognized Maalac and Nepomuceno as police officers. He did not see Ronald Ticlao, any female companion or a Tamaraw FX vehicle purportedly used by the police officers.[17
Herein appellant Julliver de Leon narrated before the court that, in the afternoon of March 19, 1997, he and his wife were in his house when police officers Borda and Libuton suddenly entered. He woke up when a gun was poked at him. When he asked why the policemen were there, herein appellant was immediately handcuffed and brought to the sala. The police operatives searched his house but found nothing illegal. He saw Maalac in a radio conversation with another person outside the house. He heard the person on the other end say, Bok, positive nakuha na namin ang ama. Maalac replied, Kuha na rin ang anak. In turn, the person at the other end asked, Bakit pa kinuha nyo yan. Sakit lang ng ulo iyan. Maalac answered, Kasubuan na, marami ng tao dito. From his house, he was brought to the Pagamutang Bayan ng Malabon and thereafter to the Drugs Enforcement Group Headquarters of the Malabon Police Station.[18
Accused George de Leon testified on how the police operatives arrested him. At about the same time that the police operatives entered and searched appellant Julliver de Leons house, George, since late morning of the same day, was having a drinking spree with his friends along Kaunlaran Street in front of a house of a certain Aguila 200 meters away from his own house and the house of the appellant. Police officers Benjamin Querubin, Cruz and Agustin arrived and told him that Captain Ona, whom he used to work for as a personal driver, was looking for him. When he replied that Captain Ona was attending a town fiesta in Batangas, they said that it was actually the Chief of Police who was looking for him. At first, he refused to go but went with them after they threatened him.
They brought him to the Barangay Hall of Muzon, Malabon, Metro Manila, then to the Pagamutang Bayan ng Malabon and later to the DEG headquarters where the two accused met each other. There, SPO1 Nepomuceno told George that they arrested Nora Boysillo, a courier of a known big-time drug pusher named Biyo Nuez, also known as Biyo Kalabaw. Being Nuez kumpadre, he was asked to reveal the whereabouts of Nuez or at least to contact the latter by cellphone to determine where he was. He felt that acceding to Nepomucenos request would endanger his family so he declined to divulge any information about Nuez.[19 As a result of his refusal to cooperate with his interrogators, he and his son were arrested and criminal charges were filed against them.
George alleged that he could not have transacted with Ticlao as he knew him to be a police aide when he was still the personal driver of Captain Ona. He said Ticlao and Boysillo testified against him due to his refusal to cooperate with the police concerning the whereabouts of Biyo Nuez. At the headquarters, Ticlao and Boysillo asked him to cooperate with the police operatives but he refused.[20
Several weeks after the incident, on April 27, 1997, Ritzie de Leon, appellant Julliver de Leons wife, filed separate complaint-affidavits before the Office of the City Prosecutor in Malabon against the raiding DEG police operatives for violation of domicile. However, the investigating prosecutor of the said complaint-affidavits, who happened to be the trial prosecutor of the subject criminal cases, dismissed the same.[21
On November 6, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
a) In Criminal Case No. 17805-MN for Drug Pushing (Section 15, Art. III, R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659): acquitting both accused, George de Leon and Julliver de Leon, on the ground of reasonable doubt;
b) In Criminal Case No. 17806-MN for Illegal Possession of Shabu (Section 16, Art. III, R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659): acquitting accused George de Leon only on the ground of reasonable doubt. Accused Julliver de Leon is thereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt and is hereby sentenced to the prison term of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine of P5,000,000.00.
Accused Julliver de Leon, being a detention prisoner, he shall be credited in full the period of detention he had already undergone in connection with these cases if he signed the written agreement allowing him to be treated while still a detention prisoner under the same rules governing prisoners already serving sentence by virtue of final judgments. Otherwise, he shall only be credited with 4/5 thereof.
The shabu subject matter of these cases are hereby forfeited in favor of the government.
SO ORDERED.[22
In acquitting George de Leon of illegal possession of regulated drugs and both George de Leon and appellant Julliver de Leon of illegal sale of regulated drugs, the trial court wrote:
The Court cannot help noting at once the fact that George was arrested in a place at least 200 meters away from where the police claimed he transacted with them for the sale of P10,000.00 worth of shabu (T.S.N. Oct. 1, 1997, page 10) and that when he was arrested he was actually in a drinking spree with several persons who claimed he never left the place since they started drinking up to the time of his arrest, with nothing having been found in his possession that will connect him to either possession of illegal drugs or to the claimed buy-bust transaction.
Also noted by the Court is the failure of the police to immediately pick him up and place him under arrest as soon as they have seen the signal from Ticlao that the buy-bust operation yielded positive results.
According to Ticlao, it did not take long for him, after George told them that Julliver will take care of everything, meaning, the delivery of shabu for which they gave George P10,000.00 to give the positive signal. Nepomuceno and the other police officers acting as back-ups for Ticlao and Boysillo allegedly saw the signal at once and they immediately pounced on Julliver. They did not, however, immediately place George under arrest.
xxx xxx xxx
There also was no rebuttal testimony on the claim that George and Ticlao knew each other long before the incident, which would make the alleged sale of shabu to Ticlao improbable as George knew him already as a police aide
All the foregoing, taken together with the testimonials of several witnesses to the effect that George was all the while with them in a drinking spree when he was arrested, cast doubt, even as the Court is not prepared to pronounce that the evidence in this case was merely planted by the police, on the alleged participation of George in these cases.
If George really transacted for the sale and delivery of shabu to Ticlao and Boysillo, at the first opportunity he should have been placed under arrest. The recovery of additional shabu would bolster his alleged participation in the sale of shabu to the poseur buyer.
With respect, therefore, to George doubt has cast in the mind of the Court concerning his guilt or innocence in these cases. In this jurisdiction, this doubt is mandated to be resolved in favor of his innocence.[23
xxx xxx xxx
But in convicting Julliver de Leon of illegal possession of regulated drugs, the trial court relied on the arresting police officers positive identification of appellant as the person who threw the envelope containing the sachets of shabu inside the bedroom in the course of the pursuit. The trial court did not give credence to the appellants defense of frame-up for the reason that the arresting officers would not have gone out of their way just to plant evidence against him.[24
Hence this appeal based on the following assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN, ALTHOUGH IT FOUND THAT THERE WAS NO BUY-BUST OPERATION THAT TOOK PLACE AND BY REASON OF WHICH IT ACQUITTED BOTH ACCUSED GEORGE DE LEON AND GULLIVER DE LEON IN CRIM. CASE NO 17805-MN, AND IT ACQUITTED GEORGE DE LEON IN CRIM. CASE NO. 17806-MN, IT DID NOT SIMILARLY ACQUIT GULLIVER DE LEON IN THE LATTER CASE FOR THE SAME REASON.
II
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT IT WAS THE ARREST OF THE ACCUSED GEORGE DE LEON (JOJIE) INSTEAD OF THE ARREST OF GULLIVER DE LEON (BAYE) THAT WAS UNPLANNED AND NOT ORDERED.
III
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO FIND DOUBTS AS TO HOW, FROM WHOM OR WHERE THE FOUR SACHETS OF SHABU (EXHS. F-1, F-2, F-3 AND F-4) SUBJECT OF CRIM. CASE NO. 17806, WERE FOUND.
IV
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRRED WHEN IT FAILED TO FIND DOUBTS AS TO HOW, FROM WHOM OR WHERE THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST MONEY (EXHS. H-1 TO H-10) WAS FOUND.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DEG POLICE OPERATIVES VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF BOTH ACCUSED AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURE.
VI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND OTHER MATERIAL INCONSISTENCIES IN THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.[25
Section 16, Article III of RA 6425, as amended by RA 7659, provides that:
Section 16. Possession or Use of the Regulated Drugs. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated drugs without the corresponding license or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof. (As amended by Sec. 16, RA No. 7659.)
Appellant Julliver de Leon contends that the trial court erred in convicting him of illegal possession of shabu because said conclusion was totally against its finding that there was no buy-bust operation that took place. Without the said buy-bust or entrapment operation, there was no valid basis for the warrantless arrest of the appellant. Hence, the DEG operatives violated the constitutional right of the appellant against unreasonable searches and seizures. And it allegedly proved his allegation that the police operatives planted the sachets of shabu due to his fathers refusal to inform them about the whereabouts of a certain Biyo Nuez. The appellant also asserts that the testimony of SPO1 Nepomuceno as to the manner of recovery of the confiscated and the buy-bust drugs was hearsay for the reason that he was not the one who recovered the same and only heard the details thereof from another police officer.
We affirm the appellants conviction for illegal possession of regulated drugs.
Appellants arrest for possession of regulated drugs proceeded from a valid buy-bust operation. Ticlao and Boysillo categorically testified on how the entrapment was effected. Their testimonies were corroborated in all material points by the arresting officers who actually witnessed how the transaction took place: accused George de Leon initiated the transaction by asking from Ticlao the quantity of shabu he wanted to buy; Ticlao asked for dalawang bulto; after receiving the marked one thousand peso bills as payment for the drugs, George called herein appellant; George handed the money to appellant and then left the compound; meanwhile, appellant went inside Georges house and came back holding a yellow envelope that contained the regulated drugs; after verifying that what was given by appellant was indeed shabu, Ticlao and Boysillo left and gave the pre-arranged signal to the police officers who then entered the compound and pursued the appellant; the latter fled and threw the envelope containing the regulated drugs inside a bedroom in Georges house.
Herein appellant cannot rely on his acquittal for the illegal sale of regulated drugs to prove that no entrapment took place and that therefore his warrantless arrest for illegal possession of regulated drugs was unlawful. According to the trial court, accused George de Leon and herein appellant were acquitted of the crime of sale of regulated drugs because Georges participation in the transaction was doubtful -- the latter was arrested 200 meters away from the scene of the sale and there was a delay in effecting his arrest.
Considering the clear and convincing evidence, it was not impossible for accused George de Leon to have participated in the sale of shabu. The distance between the place where he was arrested and the place of the transaction was only 200 meters. It was such a short distance that George could have easily initiated the deal, left the compound in the middle of the transaction, gone to his friends place and started drinking with them.
We have always ruled that alibi is an inherently weak defense that is easy to contrive and concoct. For such defense to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove that he was somewhere else when the crime occurred. He must also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime.[26
We also rule that the delay in the arrest of George should not be seen as a loophole through which he can wiggle out of criminal liability. It was more in accordance with proper legal procedure for the police officers to arrest the accused George de Leon only after the poseur-buyer and the informant gave the signal confirming that the substance they received was indeed shabu. It was of critical importance to first get hold of the shabu before George could be arrested as that was the evidence that would pin him down for the sale of drugs.
The entrapment operation paved the way for the valid warrantless arrest of appellant. Section 5(a) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides that -
(A) peace officer or a private person, without a warrant, may arrest a person: (a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense xxx
Consequently, any search resulting from said lawful warrantless arrest was also valid because the accused committed a crime in flagrante delicto, that is, the person to be arrested (appellant) committed a crime in the presence of the arresting officers or the poseur-buyer.[27
Herein appellant was caught red-handed in the act of committing the offenses for which he was charged. He made the sale in the presence of the police operatives, the poseur-buyer and the informant. When he fled, he carried then threw the envelope containing the regulated drugs inside the bedroom in full view of PO1 Libuton, the pursuing arresting officer. There was therefore no need for a warrant to arrest and search the person of appellant.
Appellant points out the inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses testimonies on the number of vehicles used in going to the place of operation, and the owner of the jeep used in the operation. But minor variances in the details of the witnesses accounts, more frequently than not, are badges of truth rather than indicia of falsehood, and they often bolster the probative value of their testimonies.[28 The inconsistencies underscored by appellant do not pertain to the actual drug deal or to the subsequent arrest of accused George and appellant.
We also consider as minor the contradiction between (1) the policemens joint affidavit of arrest, to the effect that appellant was arrested inside his house and (2) the testimony of the policemen in court, to the effect that appellant was arrested in the house of his father, accused George de Leon. Such inconsistency did not affect the credible testimonies of SPO1 Nepomuceno and PO1 Libuton that the regulated drugs were recovered inside the nipa house. SPO1 Libuton explained that they did not even know beforehand where appellants house was and they were initially of the impression that the nipa house where they arrested appellant was his (appellants) house. They only discovered the error after the entrapment operation.[29
According to appellant, the testimony of SPO1 Nepomuceno identifying the sachets of shabu as the same sachets recovered from him was hearsay evidence inasmuch as he was not the person who recovered it. We disagree. PO1 Libuton (the arresting officer who personally recovered the sachets of shabu from appellant and who turned over the said sachets to Maalac after marking the same with his initials) corroborated Nepomucenos testimony. Not only that. Even the defense itself admitted that Libutons testimony corroborated Nepomucenos.[30 In addition, Libuton categorically identified the sachets of shabu presented in court as the same sachets he recovered inside the de Leon compound due to the markings that he and Maalac wrote thereon.[31 Furthermore, during Nepomucenos testimony, appellant failed to object to the questions propounded to him (Nepomuceno). Consequently, he cannot now claim Nepomucenos testimony on the recovery of the regulated drugs to be hearsay.
In his fourth assignment of error, appellant also claims material inconsistency between Nepomucenos statement that the marked money was found in the possession of herein appellant Julliver de Leon and Libutons narration that it was recovered from the person of accused George de Leon. A reading of the records shows that appellants observation is a desperate attempt to capitalize on what was clearly the prosecutors honest mistake in utterance. To quote from Libutons testimony during the direct examination:
xxx xxx xxx
Q. After taking the yellowish envelope what then did you do, if any?
A. I looked at the contents of this yellowish envelope, sir.
Q. And what did you find (sic) the contents of this yellowish envelope?
A. Four transparent plastic sachets which contents (sic) white substance believed to be methamphetamine hydrochloride, sir.
Q. After finding out the contents of this yellowish envelope, what then did you do with this yellowish envelope together with the contents?
A. Sir, we confiscated it and have (sic) it marked for laboratory examination.
Q. Did you turn-over it to somebody else?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. To whom?
A. Melvin Maalac, sir.
Q. How about the accused Julliver you said you yourself (sic) were you able to find him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. After finding him what did you do?
A. We arrested him sir.
Q. If you see that accused Julliver de Leon again, please point him to us if he is inside the Courtroom?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Please do so?
A. Witness stepped down and approach (sic) a person, and when asked to stand up and asked his name, he gave his name as Julliver de Leon.
Q. Now, you said that the contents of the yellowish envelope were marked, who placed those markings?
A. Sir, I myself and Melvin Maalac.
Q. In what place did you place those markings?
A. A transparent plastic sachet itself.
Q. If you see those transparent plastic sachet containing shabu again, will be you able to identify it?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Why did you say that you were able to identify the same?
A. Because of my markings and the markings of policemen (sic) Maalac, sir.
Q. I am showing to your these four (4) plastic sachet (sic), please look at these and tell us what relations (sic) has this to the four sachets containing shabu you claimed you have recovered and marked?
A. These were all the four (4) plastic sachet (sic) which contents (sic) methamphetamine hydrochloride that were recovered (sic) contained on that yellowish and marked?
Q. Why did you say that those are the same four plastic sachet (sic) containing methamphetamine hydrochloride you recovered?
A. Because of my markings, sir.
Q. Please point to us the markings you placed and those placed by Maalac?
A. RCL 1, RCL 2, RCL 3, RCL 4, which stands to (sic) my surname and the initials also of MPM, 1,2,3,4, which stands to (sic) the name of Melvin P. Maalac.
Q. How about the yellowish envelope where you found those four plastic sachet (sic) containing shabu you have just identified, if you see that yellowish envelope will you be able to identify it?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. I am showing to you this yellowish envelope, please tell us what relation has that to the yellowish envelope you claimed contained these four plastic sachet (sic) of shabu you have just identified?
A. This is the same yellowish envelope, sir.
Q. Why did you say that this is the same yellowish envelope?
A. Because of the markings and the signature of Nepomuceno and Maalac with corresponding date 3-19-97.
Q. Aside from these four plastic sachet (sic) containing shabu contained in a yellowish envelope, what else did you recover when you arrested accused George de Leon?32
A. Prior to our interrogation, sir, we recovered one weighing scale and other several pieces of transparent plastic sachet intended for repackaging such methamphetamine, sir.
Q. Aside from those you mentioned, what else you recovered? (sic)
A. The marked money.
Q. How much did you recover?
A. P10,000.00, sir.
(underlining supplied)
In analyzing testimonies, the over-all impression or effect of what is said or done is controlling, not individual words and phrases alone.[33 The prosecution was asking Libuton about the circumstances surrounding appellant Julliver de Leons arrest, he being the officer who personally caught appellant committing the crime in flagrante delicto. The public prosecutors line of questioning centered on Jullivers arrest and not on Georges. His questions no doubt referred to appellant Julliver alone not to George and interchanging their names in one question was simple absent-mindedness. The truth was that there was no reason to ask Libuton anything about Georges arrest because it was not Libuton who arrested George.
We thus consider the erroneous reference to George in one question as a product of inadvertence and honest mistake which the defense should not capitalize on in its effort to seek acquittal. One honest mistake in the course of a long testimony cannot dilute the credibility of a witness.[34 As a matter of fact, honest mistakes are not inconsistent with truthful testimony. Perfect testimonies cannot be expected from persons with imperfect senses.[35
What is important in the case at bar is that appellant was caught in possession of regulated drugs after a successful and legitimate buy-bust operation. We find no proof of fabricated evidence, contrary to appellants claim.
Even the trial court did not believe appellants version of the events. To quote from the decision of the trial court, his denials will have to fail in the face of the positive identification made by the arresting officers of accused Baye (appellant) as the one from whom the more than 200 grams of shabu was confiscated xxx.[36 Frame-up, a shop-worn defense of those accused in drug-related cases, is viewed by the Court with disfavor since it is an allegation that can easily be concocted. For this claim to prosper, the defense must adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption of regularity of official acts by government officials.[37
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 72, in Criminal Case No. 17806-MN, convicting appellant Julliver de Leon of illegal possession of regulated drugs and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Morales, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
[AM No. RTJ-99-1455. July 13, 1999]
REYNALDO DE VERA, complainant, v. JUDGE SANCHO A. DAMES II, Regional Trial Court of Camarines Norte, Branch 38, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Judges cannot be disciplined for every erroneous order or decision rendered in the absence of a clear showing of ill motive, malice or bad faith This, however, is not a license for them to be negligent or abusive in performing their adjudicatory prerogatives. The absence of bad faith or malice will not totally exculpate them from charges of incompetence and ignorance of the law when they render decisions that are totally bereft of factual and legal bases.
The Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Removal dated November 24, 1997, filed by Reynaldo de Vera, charging Judge Sancho A. Dames II of the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Norte (Branch 38) with (1) serious misconduct, (2) premature release of decision and (3) knowingly rendering an unjust judgment in Criminal Case Nos. 6747, 6781 and 6782.
The Facts
In his Petition, complainant alleges the following:
That on May 8, 1990, the undersigned complainant as public school teacher of the Camarines Norte High School in Daet, Camarines Norte and as president of the Camarines Norte High School Teachers Association reported in writing to the schools division superintendent of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports at Daet, Camarines Norte the treasure hunting and excavation that ha[d] been made within the premises of the school in which Fiscal Oscar J. Villafuerte, a prosecutor in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Camarines Norte and his [kin were] involved. For said letter made by the undersigned complainant, Provincial Prosecutor Oscar J. Villafuerte filed three (3) cases of libel.
The respondent, Judge Sancho Dames II, instead of dismissing the three (3) libel cases filed against the herein complainant considering that the letter [was] a privilege[d] communication, yet His Honor gave due course to said malicious criminal complaint; hence, the undersigned ha[d] to employ the services of a lawyer, who ably defended the undersigned complainant and after a long and tedious trial, the complainants counsel filed a Memorandum which was written and could have been the proper basis for the outright dismissal of the complaint for libel. Copy of the Memorandum is hereto attached as ANNEX A;
That with the filing of said Memorandum on February 19, 1993, the respondent Judge, if he [was] acting with justice, should have absolved the accused from the complaint as there [was] no evidence to justify conviction; but instead news spread that the judge ha[d] already convicted accused and that the judgment ha[d] been set for promulgation on June 25, 1993; however, as early as the last days of May 1993, the respondent Judge Dames long before the promulgation of his decision, prematurely released said judgment and had the same published in a local newspaper BICOL POST on June 4 and 10, 1993; said premature release of the judgment [was] improper, irregular, anomalous and contemptuous; consequently, the counsel for the herein complainant as accused filed a Petition for Contempt, copy of which is hereto attached as ANNEX B;
That on September 30, 1993, the herein complainant through his counsel filed a Motion for Inhibition of Judge Dames, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex C;
That on October 11, 1992, the respondent Judge unjustly denied the Motion for Inhibition; consequently, immediately upon receipt of said Order, the herein complainant through his counsel filed a Motion to Reconsider said Order, copy of which is hereto attached as ANNEX D;
That on November 5, 1993, respondent Judge issued an unjust Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration, copy of which is hereto attached as ANNEX E; thereafter, complainants counsel, Atty. Rogelio Panotes withdrew as counsel of the accused thereby compelling herein complainant to hire the services of another counsel;
That on January 21, 1994, the accused filed a Petition for Prohibition with prayer for Restraining Order and Preliminary Mandatory Injunction with the Court of Appeals and [the Petition] was docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 33112, copy for which is hereto attached as ANNEX F;
That on February 18, 1994, the respondent Judge, showing his undue interest in behalf of the complainants in the three (3) libel cases personally filed a Comment on the Petition when he [was] not supposed to file an answer or a comment unless expressly ordered to do so; and on March 15, 1994, the Court of Appeals while deploring the premature release of the decision long before the promulgation, denied the Petition for Prohibition; copy of said decision is hereto attached and made part hereof as ANNEX G
That on April 15, 1994, the respondent Judge rendered a Decision dated April 15, 1994 convicting the accused of the three (3) charges of libel filed against him; and from the said Decision. the accused appealed and elevated the case to the Court of Appeals [and the case] was docketed as CA-GR CR No. 17798; in his Brief, the accused seeking to overturn the judgment of the respondent Judge insisted that
The lower Court erred in convicting the accused-appellant on the basis of speculations and inferences instead of acquitting him of the criminal charge of libel, it being uncontroverted that the letter communication [was] covered by the mantle of privileged communication.
The Office of the Solicitor General, after a careful and thorough study of the records, instead of filing an Appellees Brief to sustain the judgment of conviction of the herein accused, filed a Manifestation and Motion recommending that the Decision of the respondent Judge be reversed and that the herein accused be acquitted of the crime charged in the three (3) complaints;
In a Decision promulgated on July 31, 1997, a copy of which is hereto attached as ANNEX H, the members of the Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals found the appeal of the accused to be meritorious; the Court of Appeals found the findings of the respondent Judge not supported by any factual and legal justification; the Court of Appeals took note of the fact that the trial court could not cite any legal and factual basis for its conclusions in the decision, consequently, the Court of Appeals ruled as follows
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines Norte, Branch 38, in Criminal Case Nos. 6747, 6781 and 6782 is hereby REVERSED, and accused-appellant REYNALDO V. DE VERA is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime (libel) charged.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the errors of respondent Judge are so gross and inexcusable[,] indicative of his conscious and deliberate intention to do an injustice against the accused for his findings of facts are not supported by any credible evidence on record for which he should be found guilty of serious misconduct and of rendering an unjust judgment.[1
On February 9, 1998, respondent filed his Comment addressed to Court Administrator Alfredo Benipayo, stating in part:
And I am appealing to His Honor to be kindly liberal in the consideration of the arguments contained in the documents submitted, and to apply as well the following jurisprudence, to wit:
1. The proper remedy against adverse orders of judges is not an administrative action against them. The Supreme Court views with extreme disapproval the filing [by] vengeful litigants of administrative complaints to harass, terrorize and annoy judges who disappointed them (Reyes v. Judge Valdez and Judge Farrales, ADM No. RTJ-97-87-148, 9 Oct. 90, En Banc, Minute Resolution);
2. To make a judge answerable to every disgruntled Tom, Dick and Harry would make his life a living hell. The rule is that in the absence of FRAUD, DISHONESTY or CORRUPTION, the acts of a judge done in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts be erroneous (Gomez v. Judge Francisco A. Semolina, Adm. M. No. RTJ-90-488, 5 May 92 En Banc, Minute Resolution).[2
The casus belli of the present administrative case is the complainants letter, which subsequently became the subject of the libel charge. The letter is quoted hereunder.
May 8, 1990
Mrs. Priscilla G. Mariano
Schools Division Superintendent
DECS, Daet, Camarines Norte
THRU: The Assistant SDS
Madam:
Yesterday, at about 9:00 in the morning, in front of the Principals Office, in the presence of about a hundred enrolling students, some of them accompanied by their parents, elder brothers, sisters or relative[s], the guidance coordinator and about ten teachers were there, and within the hearing distance of the school employees, Mrs. Emma C. Avellana, the principal of CNNS castigated me shouting at the top of her voice: Napakawalanghiya mo, Punyeta ka. And other unprintables.
Her allegation [was] that according to reports she received I [was] the one (daw) who [was] spreading information that she already found gold and treasures in the diggings they conducted which [were] endangering their lives. Then she threatened me [with] reprisals.
I did not answer her back[;] instead I went directly inside the office to take up some problems about my advisory class.
Immediately after that, I reported this incident to Assistant Schools Division Superintendent Agustin A. Dating, to ascertain if her treasure hunting conducted sometime in April 9-30, 1990 ha[d] the authorization and permission from the Division Office.
I reported to Mr. Dating the not-so-secret excavation the families of certain Canuto, Fiscal Canuto, Fiscal Villafuerte, and relatives of Mrs. Avellana did in the guise of looking for water source to be used in the on-going school building constructions.
The suspicions of CNNHS teachers and even outsiders were aroused because the digging [was] not so ordinary.
1. They [did] not allow even workers in the school constructions to peek at the site.
2. The principal stopped the on-going CAT Summer Training for Officers.
3. The digging was conducted [during] the Holy Week, on Saturdays and Sundays, and at night.
4. Two cars, red with plate number PJU 866 and blue owned by Fiscal Villafuerte [were] constantly seen parked in the vicinity of the diggings even at night.
5. The diggings [were] not handled by real laborers, but by the nephews of the principal. There [was] no program of work, yet according to Fiscal Villafuerte, they [used] culverts.
6. One high noon, a commotion was observed by the security guard[;] a car went to and from the Office of the Principal and the site of the digging.
7. One time, almost midnight, a car was seen by a teacher xxx outside the gate, going in and out of the school ferrying something, after [which] another commotion was heard at the site of the digging.
8. The digging [was] covered by tents and streamers, and the hole [was] so wide it could accommodate two cars side by side with a small tunnel underneath.
9. Fiscal Villafuerte was acting like he [was] the foreman of the project.
10. One time, a well known politician visited the digging site.
These [were] just some of the queer observations that were reported to me, and I conducted personal investigations by virtue of my being the president of the Association, and I found more, which I am ready to inform you at the proper time.
In view of the strong reasons above-mentioned, which caused the teachers to los[e] confidence [i]n our principal and her office, particularly the school security guards/watchm[e]n, as all of them are tasked primarily, to take the responsibility of securing the government school properties.
As president of the Association, I am requesting an immediate conduct of investigation and to apply the full force of the law to those who violated it.
Very sincerely yours,
(SGD.)
REYNALDO V. DE VERA, JR.
President
Copy furnished:
1. The Regional Director, DECS 5. The Secretary, DOJ
2. The Secretary, DECS 6. Atty. R. Panotes, Manila
3. The Tanodbayan, Manila 7. The President, PFTO
4. The Regional Director, CSC 8. The Mayor, Daet, CN[3
Because of this letter, complainant was charged with and subsequently convicted of libel by respondent judge, who ruled:
If the imputation that her (Emma C. Avellana) April 9-30 not-so-secret excavation of a certain Canuto, Fiscal Villafuerte and relatives of Mrs. Avellana, two cars, red with plate number 866 and blue owned by Fiscal Villafuerte are constantly seen parked in the vicinity of the diggings even at night, and Fiscal Villafuerte was acting like he is the foreman of the project and others is not libelous/defamatory, what is this.
Accused would like to picture that Mrs. Emma C. Avellana is engaged in treasure hunting conducted on April 9-30, 1990 inside the school where she is the principal, that the family of a certain Canuto, Fiscal Villafuerte and the relatives of Mrs. Emma Avellana [are] involved in the not-so-secret excavation. Fiscal Villafuerte is likened to a foreman of the project and others. It must have been given publicity. This was admitted, and even the memorandum for the accused alleged said cases arose from the alleged defamatory letter (Exh. A, A-1) dated May 8, 1990, signed by the accused under oath and distributed to his co-teachers in Camarines Norte High School as well as to the individuals therein specified. It must be malicious, malice is presumed[;] and to overcome this presumption there must be a showing of good intention and justifiable nature. (Decision, pp. 4-5; Rollo, pp. 28-29)[4
Furthermore, the trial court stressed:
The only reason/justification given for the acts of the accused is I conducted personal investigations by virtue of my being president of the Association, and I found more, which I am ready to inform you at the proper time.
If it is true that the only motive of accused Reynaldo V. de Vera is as president of the Association, I am requesting an immediate conduct of investigation and to apply the full force of the law to those who violated it, he could have done so without the imputation of libelous/defamatory words and distributing copies of the letters [to] Camarines Norte High School teachers and others (First par., memorandum for the accused.)
Careful perusal of the facts established shows that 1. the imputation [was] indeed defamatory, 2. It was made public 3. it [was] malicious, and 4. it definitely refer[red] to particular natural persons.[5
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and acquitted the complainant based on the following disquisition:[6
In the present case, it is significant to [note] that the trial court, in its decision, expressed uncertainty as to whether the subject letter of appellant [was] libelous when it asked, If the imputation that her (Emma C. Avellana) April 9-30 and not so secret excavation of a certain Canuto, Fiscal Villafuerte and relatives of Mrs. Avellana, two cars, red with plate number 866 and blue owned by Fiscal Villafuerte are constantly seen parked in the vicinity of the diggings even at night and []Fiscal Villafuerte was acting like he [was] a foreman of the project and other is (sic) not libelous/defamatory, what is this (Decision pp. 4-5, Rollo, pp. 28-29, italics ours).
Subsequent[ly] however, the trial court made an implied declaration that the appellants letter [was] libelous/defamatory, thus: If it is true that the only motive of accused Reynaldo de Vera [was] as president of the association, I am requesting an immediate conduct of investigation . . . . ., he could have done so without the imputation of libelous/defamatory words . . . . . . (Decision p. 5, Rollo, p. 29, Italics ours).
It is noteworthy that such implied declaration made by the trial court was not supported by any factual and legal justification. Certainly such baseless conclusion that the subject letter [was] libelous/defamatory cannot sustain the appellants conviction for libel. The trial court could not cite any factual or legal basis for its conclusion simply because the appellants letter, and this we hold, does not show any defamatory or libelous imputation of a crime, vice or defect which would tend to dishonor or discredit the reputation of the private complainants. On that ground alone, the appellant deserves an acquittal.
But the trial court proceeded to commit another error. Again the trial court, without giving any factual and legal justification made another conclusion that It (the appellants letter) must be malicious, malice is presumed and to overcome this presumption there must be a showing of good intention and justifiable nature (Decision, p. 5, Rollo, p. 29; italics ours).
The subject letter not being defamatory, it [was] therefore erroneous for the trial court to hold that the said letter [was] presumed to be malicious. Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code is clear that only a defamatory imputation (as defined in Article 353) is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown ..... (italics ours). There is malice when the author of the imputation is prompted by personal ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person who claims to have been defamed (Alonzo vs. Court of Appeals, 241 SCRA 59-60, citing Ramon C. Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, Vol. III, 1988 ed., 531).
Although his letter is not defamatory, and therefore, malice is not presumed to exist, the appellant had sufficiently and convincingly shown that he had good intention and justifiable motive for writing and sending said letter. x x x.[7
Recommendation of the Court Administrator
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), in its Report dated April 9, 1999, recommended that respondent be fined P10,000, viz:
We find the complaint meritorious.
As to the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust decision, libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person or to blacken the memory of one who is dead (Art. 353, Revised Penal Code). An imputation is considered libelous if the following essential elements concur:
1. It must be defamation
2. It must be malicious
3. It must be given publicity
4. The victim must be identifiable
We have carefully analyzed the alleged libelous letter. We noted that nothing therein contain[ed] defamatory imputations which tend[ed] to dishonor or discredit the reputation of the private complainant. The purpose of the complainants letter [was] merely to seek an investigation on the alleged questionable digging activities of the private complainant inside the school campus. There was no malicious intent. The report was made in good faith and in the performance of his moral and legal duty as the president of the Schools Association.
In its reversal, the Court of Appeals declared that the trial courts decision was not supported by any factual and legal justification and noted the uncertainly of the decision as to whether the letter was libelous or not. xxx
We agree with the findings of the Court of Appeals.
This is not the way to write a decision. Judges should learn to summarize, to synthesize, to simplify. In this case, the trial judge barely complied with the constitutional requirement (Section 14, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution) that the factual and legal basis of the decision should be clearly and distinctly expressed therein (People vs. Francisco 234 333 [1994]) The decision lacks the factual and legal basis. In fact, respondent failed to cite any legal principle or authority to support his conclusion.
x x x
As to the alleged premature release of the subject decision, our record shows that the same has already been passed upon by the Court in A.M. No. RTJ-94-1144, Reynaldo De Vera vs. Judge Sancho Dames II, where in the resolution dated 2 February 1999, said respondent was admonished.
With regard xxx to whether there [was] reasonable ground for the inhibition of the respondent in the motion for contempt, the ground relied upon being bias, complainant claims that there exists a personal relationship between the respondent and private complainant Public Prosecutor Villafuerte (respondent Judge allegedly regularly plays majong with Prosecutor Villafuerte at the latters house). This probably explains the reason why respondent denied complainants counsels motion for Court Stenographer Mila to take the witness stand to shed light on the pre-mature release of the decision on the ground of self-incrimination. Record shows that it was stenographer Mila who gave a copy of the decision in advance to Public Prosecutor Villafuerte allegedly in the name of the respondent. It is our view that respondent Judge should have inhibited himself from the proceedings guided by the principle laid down in Pimentel vs. Salanga (21 SCRA 160), that:
A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstance reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the peoples faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he reflect on the probability that a losing party might nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him.
This Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings and recommendations of the Office of the Court Administrator.
As has been amply elucidated in the CA ruling and in the OCA Report, respondent failed to adhere to the basic precept enshrined in Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution, which we quote:
Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it was based.
The respondent precipitately concluded that the letter was defamatory without sufficiently explaining why. Calling the trial courts Decision baseless, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court ruling on the defamatory nature of the letter was not supported by any factual and legal justification. This statement was echoed by the OCA, which noted that respondents Decision lack[ed] factual and legal basis. In fact, respondent failed to cite any legal principle or authority to support his conclusion. Indeed, a meticulous scrutiny of the said judgment substantiates the observations of the Court of Appeals and the OCA. Indubitably, the respondents Decision was erroneous as it was baseless.
But rendering an erroneous or baseless judgment, in itself, is not sufficient to justify respondents dismissal from the service. There must be proof that such judgment was rendered with malice, corrupt motive, improper consideration or bad faith. As held in Pilipinas Bank v. Tirona-Liwag:[8
Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper consideration are sufficient defenses protecting a judicial officer charged with ignorance of the law and promulgation of an unjust decision from being held accountable for errors of judgment on the premise that no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the administration of justice can be infallible.
The Court has held that although a judge may not always be subjected to disciplinary action for every erroneous order or decision he renders, that relative immunity is not a license to be negligent or abusive and arbitrary in performing his adjudicatory prerogatives. If judges wantonly misuse the powers vested in them by law, there will be not only confusion in the administration of justice but even also oppressive disregard of the basic requirements of due process.[9
In the present case, there is no clear proof of malice, corrupt motives or improper consideration concomitant with the baseless judgment. Nonetheless, respondent must be sanctioned. Because a judge must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence,[10 he has a duty to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. Party litigants will have greater faith in the administration of justice if judges are more careful in the analysis of the facts of the case and in their grasp of legal principles. For service in the judiciary means continuous study and research on the law from beginning to end.[11 Respondent judge failed to discharge this duty.
We likewise agree with the recommendation of the OCA that respondent should have inhibited himself from the contempt proceedings. It is an ironclad principle that a judge must not only be impartial; he or she must also appear to be impartial. Hence, the judge must, at all times, maintain the appearance of fairness and impartiality. His language, both written and spoken, must be guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued.[12
In the present case, it was established that the judge was a mahjong partner of one of the complainants (for whom he had ruled favorably) in the libel case. Consequently, he cannot be said to have been wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. Thus, he should have inhibited himself out of delicadeza, so that his integrity would not be stained with suspicion. As the Court has eloquently stated, however upright the judge, and however free from the slightest inclination but to do justice, there is peril of his unconscious bias or prejudice, or lest any former opinion formed ex parte may still linger to affect unconsciously his present judgment, or lest he may be moved or swayed unconsciously by his knowledge of the facts which may not be revealed or stated at the trial, or cannot under the rules of evidence. No effort of the will can shut out memory; there is no art of forgetting. We cannot be certain that the human mind will deliberate and determine unaffected by that which it knows, but which it should forget in the process.[13
Hence, consistent with the penalty in Villaluz v. Mijares,[14 we impose upon respondent a fine of P10,000.
WHEREFORE, Respondent Judge Sancho A. Dames II is found GUILTY of incompetence and ignorance of the law and is hereby ordered to PAY a fine of ten thousand pesos (P10,000). He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or a similar act shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to his personal records.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 75295 March 17, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ESRAEL AMONDINA, AQUILLO CATAYTAY and ROMULO AMANTILLO, Accused-Appellants.
CRUZ, J.:
The decision of the trial court is exceedingly long, without any effort to trim the fat and keep it lean. Judges are not stenographers transcribing the testimony of the witnesses word for word. Judges must know how to synthetize, to summarize, to simplify. Their failure to do so is one of the main reasons for the delay in the administration of justice. It also explains the despair of the public over the foot-dragging of many courts and their inability to get to the point and to get there fast.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The 17-page single-spaced decision of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental convicted Esrael Amondina, Aquillo Cataytay and Romulo Amantillo of the murder of Floro Gantalao and sentenced them to reclusion perpetua and a civil indemnity of P30,000.00. 1 It is now on appeal, but not because of its inordinate verbosity although this is a valid ground for distress. The claim is that a proper appreciation of the evidence, especially of the defense, should have led the trial judge to a verdict of acquittal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The killing occurred at twilight of February 23, 1983, at the townsite of Poblacion, Mabinay, Negros Oriental.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
According to Francisco Tangon, he was pasturing his carabao at the time and from where be was be saw the three accused sitting on the side of the road some 36 feet away. He recognized all of them because he had known Amondina since 1969 and Cataytay and Amantillo were his neighbors. When Floro Gantalao arrived, the three men immediately and suddenly attacked him. Amondina swung a pestle at Floro and hit him in the left jaw, sending him sprawling to the ground. Cataytay followed suit by hacking Floro with a long bolo that bloodied and fractured the defenseless man's head. Amantillo then struck Floro in the nape with a piece of wood around 2 feet long as the latter lay wounded and helpless. The three men then fled, as so did Tangon who ran in the opposite direction toward his house. But not before he had drawn their attention and was recognized. 2 chanrobles virtual law library
Tangon said that later that same night, Amondina came to his house and warned him not to tell anyone about the incident, otherwise he would be killed. Nevertheless, when he woke up at 4:00 o'clock the following morning, he reported the matter to the police, and he and four other men went to the scene of the crime at 5:00 a.m. to retrieve Floro's body. There were already two policemen at the scene, namely, Jessie Mission and Jomie Moreno. Tangon testified that he secretly told Moreno what he had witnessed the night before. 3 chanrobles virtual law library
The victim's wife, Manolita Gantalao, declared on the stand that on February 23, 1984, at around 6:00 p.m. she went to the Namangyan river to get their carabao and on her way home, espied the three accused. Upon seeing her, they seemed frightened and started running toward the "hagonoy" bushes. When she reached home, she waited for her husband who was supposed to return early because he was going to work as a watchman at the NAPOCOR tower. It was later that night that his lifeless body was found by a search party composed of relatives near the road in the "hagonoy" bushes, where she had earlier seen the three accused. 4 chanrobles virtual law library
Jomie Moreno, the policeman who investigated the killing in the early morning of February 24, 1984, said that Francisco Tangon approached him then and said that the killers of Gantalao were Amondina, Cataytay and Amantillo. Moreno added that having been informed that somebody had seen drops of blood on the steps of the uninhabited house of Eleuterio Acosta, he proceeded to that place and found a pestle with stains of blood, small stones and "hagonoy" grass sticking to it. Moreno went next to the house of Aquillo Cataytay, whose wife allowed him to take a pair of blood-stained pants hanging on a window beam and one long bolo ("pinuti") which had blood on its handle and on the point of the blade. Finally, at the house of Romulo Amantillo, to which he was also admitted, Moreno recovered a 14-inch machete with blood stains on its handle. 5 chanrobles virtual law library
The injuries sustained by the victim, as reported by Dr. Herminio Garcia, 6 who conducted the autopsy, were consistent with the narration by Tangon of the attack upon Gantalao by the three accused with their respective weapons.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The common defense of the three accused was denial and alibi. Cataytay claimed that on February 23, 1984, he worked on his farm in Barangay Namangka and went home at around 5:00 p.m., staying there until the next morning. He was alone because his wife was in Bindoy with her mother. 7 Amondina testified that on that same date he too worked on his farm, which is 1 kilometer from Cataytay's place and 50 yards from the Namangyan river, and went home at 5:00 p.m. to his wife and children. He woke up at 4 o'clock the following morning. 8 Amantillo swore that on February 23, 1984, he was working on his farm, which is 1/2 kilometer from Cataytay's farm and 100 meters from the Namangyan river, until 5:00 p.m., when he went back to his house, staying there until 5:00 o'clock the following morning with his wife and 7-month old child. 9 chanrobles virtual law library
The appellants' brief stresses the inconsistency of the trial court in convicting the accused after casting much doubt on the prosecution witnesses in its order dated October 10, 1984. 10 In that order, the trial judge granted bail on the finding that the evidence of their guilt was not strong.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The Solicitor General correctly observed:
The resolution of a petition for bail is not based on the entirety of the evidence presented during the trial on the merits. The trial court's initial finding that the evidence of guilt is not strong cannot be treated as an irrevocable finding of reasonable doubt thereby ensuring an inevitable acquittal. Otherwise, the merits of a criminal case will be resolved entirely in the bail hearing thereby dispensing of the need to proceed any further. 11 chanrobles virtual law library
As for the alleged contradictions of Tangon and Moreno, we find that they are not of such consequence as to impair the veracity of their testimonies in their entirety. Moreover, we have held that contradictions in the testimony of a witness, instead of suggesting prevarication, may in fact indicate veracity and bolster the probative value of such testimony as a whole. 12 The separate testimonies of witnesses are not required to mesh with perfect congruence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Motive is essential only when there is doubt as to the identity of the assailant, but not when the accused has been positively identified, as in the case before us. It is worth noting that, according to the victim's wife, there had earlier been a heated argument between Floro and Amondina over the sharing of a harvest. Her husband had suspected Cataytay of stealing his chickens. Amantillo on the other hand, is the uncle of Cataytay. These might have been the reasons for the resentment of the accused against Floro, and their ganging up on him that night.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We fully agree with the following observation of the Solicitor General in calling for the affirmation of the challenged judgment:
The case for the prosecution could not have been any stronger than if the deceased himself testified. The prosecution presented an impartial eyewitness who saw and described with detail the killing of the deceased. It presented the investigating officer whose investigation yielded physical and testimonial evidence that corroborated the eyewitness account. It presented the widow of the deceased whose testimony corroborated that of the eyewitness and provided factual basis for inferring plausible motives. The fact that she is the widow of the victim does not ipso facto make her a biased witness. (People v. Urgel, 134 SCRA 483) The results of the examination conducted by the investigating medico-legal physician supports the version of the eyewitness as to the manner with which the victim was killed. The evidence adduced by the prosecution satisfies the standard of moral certainty for conviction in criminal cases. 13 chanrobles virtual law library
We also approve the finding of a conspiracy among the three accused based on the concert of their acts obviously aimed at the common purpose of killing Floro. As conspirators, they are all equally liable for the victim's death, whoever of them actually dealt the lethal blow.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The killing was qualified by treachery because of the sudden and consecutive attacks made by the three accused which were calculated to insure its execution without risk to them arising from the defense the victim might make. Treachery absorbs the circumstances of superior strength and aid of armed men, 14 which should not have been separately considered by the trial court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Scoffing at the corpse has not been proved. There is no showing that the victim was already dead when Amantillo struck him with the piece of wood after the attack by Amondina and Cataytay. This conclusion is not supported by the autopsy report or the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Evident premeditation is likewise not present in this case because it has not been shown that the three accused purposely waited for the deceased in order to kill him. The prosecution has not established the elements of evident premeditation, to wit: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the offense; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit had clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient interval of time between that determination and the execution of the offense. 15 chanrobles virtual law library
We are satisfied that the guilt of the accused-appellants in the murder of Floro Gantilao has been proved beyond reasonable doubt and that they are justly punished with reclusion perpetua and all its accessory penalties. However, we shall increase the civil indemnity, for which all three accused-appellants are solidarily liable, to P50,000.00.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the judgment of the trial court as above modified is AFFIRMED, with costs against the accused-appellants. It is so ordered.
Griño-Aquino, Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
Monday, January 24, 2011
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
